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DON'T ABOLISH EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETE
AGREEMENTS
Alan J. Meese*

For over three centuries, Anglo-American courts have
assessed employee noncompete agreements under a Rule of
Reason. Despite long-standingprecedent, some now advocate
banning all such agreements. These advocates contend that
employers use superior bargainingpower to impose such
"contracts of adhesion," preventing employees from selling
their labor to the highest bidder and reducing wages.
Abolitionists also contend that such agreements cannot
produce cognizable benefits and that employers could achieve
any benefits via less restrictive alternatives without limiting
employee autonomy.
This Article critiques the Abolitionist position.
Arguments for banning noncompete agreements echo hostile
critiques of other nonstandard contracts during antitrust
law's "inhospitalityera." These critiques induced courts and
agencies to condemn various nonstandard agreements.
Employee noncompete agreements escaped condemnation
because they were governed by state contract law.
The Article recounts how Transaction Cost Economics
("TCE") undermined these critiques. TCE demonstrated that
nonstandardagreements, such as exclusive territories,could
overcome market failures by preventing dealers from free
TCE also
riding on each other's promotional efforts.
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TCE also undermines the case against employee
noncompete agreements. Most notably, TCE predicts that
most such agreements are voluntary methods of ensuring that
employers capture the benefits of investing in employee
training and trade secrets by deterring rival firms from free
* Ball Professor of Law, Dean's Faculty Fellow and Co-Director, Center for
the Study of Law and Markets, William & Mary Law School.
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riding on such investments and bidding away employees.
Application of TCE also rebuts claims that less restrictive
alternatives will achieve the same objectives as noncompete
agreements.
Finally, TCE undermines contentions that employee
noncompete agreements injure employees by preventing them
from receiving lucrative bids from competing employers. This
account of harm treats hypothesized bids and resulting
imagined (higher) wages as an exogenous baseline against
which to measure the impact of such agreements. According
to TCE, however, such bids are not exogenous. Instead, such
bids often occur because noncompete agreements incentivize
employers to make investments that increase employee
productivity. Banning such agreements will thus reduce
employee productivity, eliminatingthe incentive for rivals to
bid for employees. In such cases, claims that noncompete
agreements reduce wages invoke an illusory baseline of bids
that would not occur but for the enforcement of such
agreements.
Empirical evidence confirms TCE's predictions. Many
such agreements apparentlyarise in unconcentratedmarkets.
Most are disclosed in advance, and robust enforcement
induces additional employee training. Finally, employees
who receive preemployment notice of such provisions earn
higher wages than similarly situated employees not bound by
such agreements. Thus, many such agreements appear to be
voluntary means of protecting investments in employee
training, improving employee productivity, and increasing
gross domestic product ("GDP").
This is not to say that all employee noncompete
agreements produce significant benefits. Some employers
decline to disclose such contracts until after employees join
the firm. Such agreements apparentlydepress wages without
producing benefits. Moreover, some employee noncompete
agreements could raise rivals' costs and enhance employers'
market power.
Neitherpotential impact justifies abolition. States or the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission") could
encourage or require pre-contractual disclosure, leaving
employers and employees free to adopt provisions that
increase their joint welfare. Moreover, even the inventors of
raisingrivals' costs theory opined that most markets are not
susceptible to such a strategy. Abolitionists have made no
effort to establish that employee noncompete agreements
usually arise in markets where such a strategy is possible.
The rare prospect that parties may employ fully disclosed
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agreements to pursue such a strategy does not justify
abolishing all employee noncompete agreements.
Indeed, banning all such agreements may have a
disparate impact on small, labor-intensive firms by
discouragingoptimal investments in employee training. This
potential impact may help explain labor union support for
abolishing such agreements. Unionized firms predictably
adopt capital-intensiveproduction processes in response to

collective bargaining and resulting noncompetitive wages.
Laws that disadvantagenonunion, labor-intensivefirms will
enhance the demand for the output of unionized firms,
Banning
increasing the demand for unionized labor.
noncompete agreements will thus sometimes boost unionized
workers at the expense of their nonunion counterparts.
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INTRODUCTION

Employees who leave their jobs are generally free to work
wherever they please or start new firms.1 Sometimes, however,
These
employee noncompete agreements restrict this freedom.
rival
for
from
working
contracts prevent departing employees
and
others
Economists
businesses.
competing
starting
or
employers
describe such agreements as "nonstandard contracts" because they do
more than simply mediate the exchange of money for employee labor,
but instead constrain employees after the main transaction. 2
Two bodies of law govern the validity of such agreements. First,
the general law of contracts refuses to enforce agreements obtained
without mutual assent or via fraud. More importantly, contract law
also declines to enforce those agreements that unduly restrict
competition between employers for employee services.
Second,
trade
that restrain
agreements
condemns
antitrust law
"unreasonably" by producing economic harm in a relevant market.
For more than three centuries, courts applying the law of
contracts have concluded that many employee noncompete
agreements produce significant benefits that justify their
enforcement, despite any impact on employee autonomy and
competition. These courts have asked whether such post-employment
restrictions are "reasonable," although the content of this inquiry has
Most importantly, courts do not require
evolved over time. 3
employees challenging such agreements to demonstrate competitive
1. For the sake of economy and readability, the author has minimized the
number of footnotes in the introduction. The discussion and footnotes in Parts IVIII provide ample support for any assertion without footnote support in the
introduction.

2. See Alan J. Meese, Robert Bork's ForgottenRole in the Transaction Cost
Revolution, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 953, 957 (2014).
3. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 368 (1967),
overruled by Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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harm, but instead condemn restraints that are broader than
necessary to produce any benefits. Moreover, some courts require
employers to demonstrate that such agreements advance legitimate
objectives. Despite such robust scrutiny, courts enforce many such
agreements. 4
By contrast, courts assessing employee noncompete agreements

under antitrust laws have always taken a "hands off' approach. 5 This
was so even during antitrust's "inhospitality era," when agencies and
courts condemned numerous nonstandard contracts that likely
produced efficiencies and did little harm.6 Today, antitrust courts
assess employee noncompete agreements under a fact-intensive Rule
of Reason. Under this standard, challengers must establish that the
restraint imposes harm, such as higher prices (or lower wages),
reduced output, or lower quality. Plaintiffs virtually always fail to
establish such harm, with the result that a decision to assess an
agreement under the Rule of Reason is almost a de facto rejection of
any challenge.
Despite long-standing precedent, numerous scholars and think
tank advocates now support abolishing employee noncompete
These Abolitionists contend that employers use
agreements.
monopsony power in labor markets coercively to foist such "contracts
of adhesion" on employees.7 They also contend that such agreements
generally reduce wages by preventing employees from selling their
labor to the highest bidder. 'Finally, Abolitionists claim that
employers can use such agreements to raise the costs of rival firms by
depriving them of access to the labor of potential employees. In this
way, Abolitionists say, incumbent firms can enhance their power in
product markets.
Abolitionists also contend that such contracts lack any "credible
justification." 8 They apparently concede that, without employee
noncompete agreements, firms might bid employees away from
employers who have provided expensive training or shared trade
4.
(Nov.

Sterling L. Miller, Drafting an Enforceable Noncompete Agreement, ABA
7,
2019),

https://www.americanbar.org/groups/businesslaw/publications/blt/2019/11/non
compete-agreement/.

5. See Harvey J. Goldschmid, Antitrust's Neglected Stepchild: A Proposal
for Dealing with Restrictive Covenants Under Federal Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1197-98 (1973).
6. John M. Newman, Procompetitive Justifications in Antitrust Law, 94
IND. L.J. 501, 532 n.244 (2019).
7. Open Mkts. Inst. et al., Petition for Rulemaking to Prohibit Worker NonCompete
Clauses
17,
21
(Mar.
20,
2019),
available
at
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e449c8c3ef68d752f3e70dc/t/5eaa04862ff5
2116dldd04cl/1588200595775/Petition-for-Rulemaking-to-Prohibit-WorkerNon-Compete-Clauses.pdf [hereinafter Petition].
8. Id. at 3.
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secrets, thereby free riding on these beneficial investments. Still,
Abolitionists contend that such free riding is just vigorous
competition that benefits consumers and society. These advocates
also claim that less restrictive alternatives can fully protect
investments in training and the generation of trade secrets.
Perhaps the most comprehensive articulation of the Abolitionist
position is found in a recent Petition for Rulemaking ("Petition") filed
9
with the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission").
Signed by dozens of academics, advocates, nonprofits, and unions, the
Petition contends that employee noncompete agreements are
"inherently suspect" and thus presumptively unlawful under Section
1 of the Sherman Act. 10 While not per se condemnation, such a
determination would allow parties to establish a prima facie case
against these agreements without proving anticompetitive harm.
Even if an employer could demonstrate offsetting benefits, courts and
agencies would still condemn the agreement if there is a less
restrictive means of achieving the same objective. If less restrictive
alternatives really are always available, a declaration that such
agreements are inherently suspect will result in wholesale
condemnation of these contracts, though nominally on a case-by-case
basis.
The Petition also asks the Commission to ban all employee
noncompete agreements as "unfair methods of competition" and thus
violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act. 11 Such a ban would achieve
the same result as declaring such agreements "inherently suspect,"
albeit without case-by-case adjudication rejecting defendants' futile
efforts to justify such restraints. The Commission's announcement
seeking comments seemed sympathetic to the Abolitionist position,
describing such agreements as "one-sided contract terms that may
exacerbate or lock in power disparities." 12
This Article critiques the Abolitionist view of employee
Because such agreements control the
noncompete agreements.
conduct of (former) employees after the transaction they accompany,
they are "nonstandard contracts," analogous to exclusive territories,
During antitrust's
tying contracts, and exclusive dealing.13
scholars applying
antitrust
and
economists
inhospitality era,

9. Id. at 1, 3-5.
10. Id. at 4 & n.6, 56-69.
11. Id. at 4-5.
12. FTC, Request for Public Comment Regarding Contract Terms That May
Harm Fair Competition, REGULATIONS.GOv [hereinafter FTC Request for Public
Comment], https://www.regulations.gov/docket/FTC-2021-0036 (last visited June

14, 2022).
13. Alan J. Meese, Refraining Antitrust in Light of Scientific Revolution:
Accounting for Transaction Costs in Rule of Reason Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
457, 472 (2010).
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neoclassical price theory concluded that nonstandard contracts--even
those in competitive markets-were anticompetitive because they
reduced commercial rivalry while rarely producing cognizable
benefits. The same experts also concluded that less restrictive
alternatives sufficed to further any legitimate interests that might
justify such agreements. Finally, experts opined that firms used
market power to impose these agreements on dealers and consumers.
Not surprisingly, agencies and courts concluded that such
agreements were invariably expressions of preexisting market power

and efforts to protect such power or obtain additional power.
Employee noncompete agreements escaped condemnation as courts

generally treated such agreements as the province of state contract
law. State courts enforced those agreements that were no broader
than necessary to protect employer investments in training and/or
trade secrets.
The Abolitionist critique of employee noncompete agreements
echoes the inhospitality era critiques of other nonstandard contracts,
particularly those governing the distribution of manufactured goods
by independent dealers. However, that era is long gone. For more
than four decades, economists and antitrust scholars have embraced
Transaction Cost Economics ("TCE") and its interpretation of
nonstandard contracts. TCE concludes that most such agreements
overcome market failures and improve the allocation of productive
resources. Unlike neoclassical price theory, then, TCE's account
explains how such contracts can arise in competitive markets. Courts
and agencies have followed suit, reversing various precedents and
enforcement policies. Courts and agencies now assess all employee
noncompete agreements under the Rule of Reason, and proponents of
such agreements almost always prevail.
TCE also undermines Abolitionists' hostility to employee
noncompete agreements. Most Americans work in unconcentrated
labor markets, and many such agreements apparently arise in
The presence of these agreements in
competitive markets.
competitive markets supports the inference that some such contracts
produce significant benefits.
TCE and additional empirical evidence confirm this inference.
Like nonstandard distribution contracts, employee noncompete
agreements restrain unbridled rivalry at a particular moment-after
the main transaction. However, application of TCE suggests that,
like nonstandard distribution restraints, employee noncompete
agreements can counteract market failures that result from atomistic
post-transaction rivalry, by creating the contractual equivalent of a
property right. For instance, such agreements can ensure that
employers capture the benefits of investments in training employees,
by preventing employers from free riding on such investments and
bidding such employees away. Moreover, such contractual property
rights can also encourage firms to produce information by precluding
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former employees from sharing such knowledge with new employers.
Transaction cost considerations also establish that the less restrictive
alternatives highlighted by Abolitionists will be substantially less
effective at achieving these benefits.
TCE also undermines the claim that such agreements are
"contracts of adhesion" imposed on unwilling employees. When
employers disclose such agreements to prospective employees, TCE
predicts that employees will obtain higher wages that offset any
future restrictions on their autonomy. Such higher wages share the
gains of increased productivity with employees who voluntarily agree
to such provisions and receive enhanced training and/or access to
This increased productivity fosters interbrand
information.
competition and translates into long-term improvements in gross
domestic product ("GDP"). Such agreements are thus a voluntary
"win, win, win" for employers, employees, and the rest of society.
TCE also undermines the Abolitionist account of the harmreduced wages-that noncompete agreements supposedly produce.
This account of harm imagines a world with no restraint where
competing firms outbid the original employer for the employee's labor,
thereby increasing employee wages.

Noncompete agreements thus

reduce wages, it is said, by preventing employees from accepting such
bids, reducing wages below the nonrestraint baseline.
TCE teaches that the prospect of such bids is not exogenous but
instead turns upon the productivity of employees. That productivity
depends, in part, upon the training that the original employer
provides.

Employee

noncompete

agreements

are

frequently

necessary to induce employer investments that enhance employee
productivity and thus give rise to possible outside bidding.
Abolitionists and others want employees to "have their cake and eat
it too," that is, atomistic competition for labor, unconstrained by
noncompete agreements, and robust outside bidding. However, this
happy state of affairs is often not a sustainable equilibrium. Simply
put, the prospect of atomistic rivalry in the labor market will often
deter employers from making investments that enhance employee
productivity and encourage robust outside bidding. Banning such
agreements would therefore discourage the very investments that
make employees attractive to other firms. The nonrestraint baseline
that Abolitionists invoke is often illusory because judicial
enforcement of such agreements is necessary to improve employee
productivity and induce competitive bids.
Recent studies apparently confirm the predictions of TCE
regarding the function and impact of employee noncompete
agreements. Employees in states with average enforcement of such
agreements receive significantly more training than employees in
states with low enforcement. Moreover, most employees receive
preemployment notice of such agreements. Finally, employees who
do receive preemployment notice earn significantly higher wages,
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other things being equal. In short, a significant proportion of such
agreements appear to be voluntary means of ensuring that employers
capture the benefits of investing in employee training, thereby
encouraging such investments.
This is not to say that all employee noncompete agreements
produce such benefits. As Abolitionists emphasize, some employers
do not disclose such agreements until after the employee joins the
firm. Employers may thus impose such agreements even if they do
not produce shared productivity gains. Moreover, these agreements
can sometimes raise the costs of rivals and thus create market power
that harms consumers.
Neither potential impact justifies abolishing noncompete
agreements. While lack of pre-contractual disclosure may result in
some nonoptimal agreements, states or the FTC could remedy this
problem without abolishing all such contracts. Indeed, some states
already decline to enforce agreements obtained in this manner unless
the employer provides adequate additional consideration. States or
the FTC could also prohibit agreements obtained without advanced
disclosure. Both such remedies would encourage pre-contractual
disclosure and deter agreements that do not maximize the joint
wealth of employer and employee, leaving both free to adopt
provisions that do increase wealth.
Of course, encouraging pre-contractual disclosure will not
discourage agreements that raise rivals' costs and thus create market
power.
Employers will obtain voluntary agreement to such
provisions, sharing expected profits with employees by increasing
wages. However, successful pursuit of a raising rivals' costs strategy
requires the rare coincidence of several independent factors. Indeed,
the inventors of raising rivals' costs theory opined that most markets
are not susceptible to such a strategy. Moreover, Abolitionists have
made no effort to establish that employee noncompete agreements
usually arise in markets where such a strategy is possible. The rare
prospect that parties may employ fully disclosed agreements to
pursue such a strategy does not justify abolishing all such
agreements.

If anything, the theory of raising rivals' costs counsels against
abolishing employee noncompete agreements. Small firms sometimes
employ nonstandard agreements to facilitate activities that enhance
interbrand competition against larger rivals.
Inhospitality era
condemnation of such agreements disadvantaged small firms and
hampered such rivalry.
Abolishing employee noncompete agreements could have a
similar impact. Many small firms adopt production processes that
are labor-intensive compared to larger establishments. These firms
rely more heavily on measures designed to enhance employee
productivity, such as training, than their capital-intensive rivals.
Banning employee noncompete agreements would have a disparate
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impact on such smaller firms, reducing interbrand competition and
enhancing the market power of larger enterprises.
Indeed, this potential impact may help explain why several labor
Unionized firms
unions support abolishing such agreements.
in response
processes
production
capital-intensive
adopt
predictably
level.
competitive
above
the
wages
to collective bargaining that drives
will
impose
agreements
banning
noncompete
circumstances,
In these
a disparate impact on nonunion, labor-intensive firms, rendering
these firms less productive than they otherwise would be. Unionized
firms would thus experience additional demand for their own
Banning
products and thus demand more (unionized) labor.
at
workers
unionized
boost
sometimes
noncompete agreements will
counterparts.
nonunion
the expense of their
Part I of this Article provides a brief legal history of employee
noncompete agreements. Part II summarizes the case for abolishing
such agreements, particularly as articulated by the Petition for
Part III explains that
Rulemaking currently before the FTC.
contracts. Part
are
nonstandard
agreements
noncompete
employee
contracts
nonstandard
other
treatment
the
hostile
IV describes
as
the
economic
as
well
era,
inhospitality
antitrust's
during
received
the
V
refutes
Part
hostility.
such
that
inspired
assumptions
Abolitionist claim that employee noncompete agreements are
generally the result of unequal bargaining power or some other defect
in the bargaining process. Part VI explains that developments in
economic science and new empirical evidence undermine Abolitionist
claims that such agreements never produce cognizable benefits. Part
VII explains that the unlikely prospect that employers will use such
agreements to protect or gain market power in the product market
does not militate in favor of a per se ban. Part VIII explains that
banning such agreements will predictably raise the costs of small,
labor-intensive rivals, thereby protecting larger, capital-intensive
firms from interbrand competition.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEE
NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS

Employee noncompete agreements prevent departing employees
from working for rival employers or starting competing businesses. 14
Foundational antitrust decisions have sketched the historical
treatment of employee noncompete agreements and analogous
agreements, such as covenants ancillary to the sale of a business. 15
14.

Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Mills, 127 S.E.2d 796, 797-98 (Ga. 1962)

(enforcing agreement by former employee not to work for competing business);

Hitchcock v. Coker (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 167 (KB) (enforcing an agreement
precluding former employee from opening a competing business).

15. Of course, the general law of contracts declines to enforce those
agreements obtained without mutual assent or via fraud.

See RESTATEMENT
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Initially, courts simply declined to enforce such contracts, regardless
of their impact. 16 Early in the eighteenth century, English courts
switched course, enforcing such agreements if they were reasonable. 17
While the original case involved a covenant ancillary to the sale of a
business, English courts soon employed similar logic to enforce
employee noncompete agreements. 18
Courts initially employed a three-part test to determine if such
First, they asked whether the
restraints were reasonable. 19
agreement was "general," i.e., governed the entire kingdom or was
instead "particular" or "partial," that is, left the former employee free
to practice the vocation in part of the realm. 20 Next, courts assessed
the extent of consideration that the restrained party received. 21 If the
agreement was partial and founded on adequate consideration, the
court then asked whether it was broader than necessary in space
and/or time to serve the employer's valid objectives. 22
By the mid-nineteenth century, English courts had abandoned
any independent assessment of consideration. 23 Some American
courts had already done so.2 4 Some American courts also abandoned
(SECOND) OF CONTS. § 17(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981); id. § 164. This article takes these
background rules as a given.
16. See Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51
(1911) ("Originally all such contracts were considered to be illegal .... "); United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898).
17. See, e.g., Mitchel v. Reynolds (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (QB) 348.
18. See, e.g., Hitchcock, 112 Eng. Rep. at 170-71 (enforcing agreement
whereby druggist promised to train an employee in return for employee's promise

not to open a competing establishment); Horner v. Graves (1831) 131 Eng. Rep.
284 (CP) 284, 288 (declining to enforce agreement precluding dentist's former
employee from pursuing this vocation within 100 miles of the former employer's
location because such a restriction was broader than necessary to protect
employer's legitimate interest).

19. Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 348.
20. Id. at 349; Horner, 131 Eng. Rep. at 287 (asking whether agreement was
"in particular and partial restraint of trade only"). See also Harlan M. Blake,

Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630 (1960) (treating
"particular" and "partial" as synonymous in this context).
21.
See Horner, 131 Eng. Rep. at 287 (inquiring whether agreement was

"made upon a good and sufficient consideration"); Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 349
(asking

whether

agreement

was

supported

by

"good

and

adequate

consideration"); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The ShermanAct and the Classical
Theory of Competition, 74 IowA L. REV. 1019, 1027 (1989) ("Early on, courts
stressed that promises not to compete would be enforced only if supported by
adequate consideration.").

22. See Blake, supra note 20, at 632; see also Alger v. Thacher, 36 Mass. (19
Pick.) 51, 54-55 (1837) (declining to enforce agreement precluding defendant
from pursuing vocation because restriction was unlimited in space).

23. See Hitchcock, 112 Eng. Rep. at 174-75.
24. See, e.g., Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. (8 Tyng) 223, 228 (1811) (enforcing
covenant not to compete based upon recited consideration of $1).
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their refusal to enforce agreements that governed an entire state. 25
By the early twentieth century, courts assessing employee
noncompete agreements mainly asked whether: (1) the agreement
protected some "legitimate interest" of the employer; and (2) whether
the agreement was broader than necessary in time, space, or industry
definition to achieve that interest. 26 Some courts also asked, at least
rhetorically, whether the restraint imposed undue hardship on the
former employee and/or produced public harm in the form of
monopoly or higher prices. 27
Modern courts articulate and apply a similar test.28 Some courts
hold that proponents of the agreement, generally plaintiff-employers
seeking to enforce such agreements against former employees, bear
an initial burden of pleading and proving that the restraint they urge
the court to enforce is reasonable. 29 Proponents of the modern
approach contend that this standard strikes the right balance
between per se condemnation and automatic enforcement. These
scholars argue that this approach gives courts the flexibility
necessary to account for the myriad attributes of such agreements,
including the industry, occupation, duration, geographic scope,
industry scope of the restraint, market shares, and others, that bear
upon the reasonableness of such restraints. 30 Thus, a restraint
enforceable in one industry because it strikes the right balance may
25. See Blake, supra note 20, at 644; see also Oregon Steam Navigation Co.
v. Winsor, 87 U.S. 64, 67 (1873). But see Union Strawboard Co. v. Bonfield, 61
N.E. 1038, 1039-40 (Ill. 1901) (declining to enforce covenant ancillary to the sale
of a business because it excluded defendant from entire state).
26. See Blake, supra note 20, at 648-50 (summarizing then-current case law

and collecting citations).
27. See id.
28. See Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon, 576 F.3d 1223, 1230-31 (11th
Cir. 2009) (describing inquiry under Florida law as whether restraint is
"reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate business interest[s]" (quoting

FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(c))); Techworks, LLC v. Wille, 770 N.W.2d 727, 731 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2009) (stating that, to survive scrutiny, a restraint "must: (1) be
necessary for the protection of the employer or principal; (2) provide a reasonable

time restriction; (3) provide a reasonable territorial limit; (4) not be harsh or
oppressive to the employee; and (5) not be contrary to public policy" (quoting Gen.

Med. Corp. v. Kobs, 507 N.W. 381, 384 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993))); Off. Mates 5, N.
Shore, Inc. v. Hazen, 599 N.E.2d 1072, 1080 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (describing
inquiry as "whether the terms of the agreement are reasonable and necessary to
protect a legitimate business interest of the employer").

29. See Proudfoot Consulting Co., 576 F.3d at 1231 (quoting Florida statute,
FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(c), requiring proponent to "plead and prove the existence
of one or more legitimate business interests justifying the restrictive covenant");

Wille, 770 N.W.2d at 732 ("[T]he employer has the burden to prove that a
noncompete agreement is reasonable .... ").

30. See Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted Sichelman, The Case for Noncompetes,
87 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 1042-45 (2020).
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prove invalid in another because it is broader than necessary to
protect the employer's legitimate interest and thus unduly restricts
the mobility of the employee. 31 At the same time, a few states, most
32
notably California, decline to enforce such agreements altogether.
The jurisprudence discussed so far has addressed the narrow
question of whether courts would enforce an agreement at the behest
of one of the parties, a question arising under the general law of
contracts. The Sherman Act created the possibility at least that
federal courts would affirmatively ban such contracts by imposing
33
fines or treble damages on the proponents of such agreements.
Indeed, William Howard Taft asserted as much in United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 34 There Taft opined that the Sherman Act
bans those agreements that courts would not have enforced at
35
common law, so long as the "trade . . . restrained was interstate."
Naked restraints, he said, were automatically unenforceable, while
courts enforced ancillary agreements if reasonable. 36 Moreover, Taft
identified two attributes that would render such agreements
unreasonable: (1) the agreements are general instead of partial; or (2)
even if partial, the agreements are broader than necessary to achieve
Taft identified five categories of ancillary
their objectives. 37
38
He
restraints, including employee noncompete agreements.
enforced
that
decision
an
English
approval
with
discussed and quoted
such an agreement, on the grounds that such agreements would
encourage employers to train and share information with
employees. 39
Both before and after Addyston Pipe, however, the Supreme
Court confirmed that the restraints Taft described as ancillary
exceeded the reach of the Act, even if they were unreasonable and
thus unenforceable at common law. 40 In United States v. E.C. Knight

31. See id. at 1043-44.
32. Id. at 958 (reporting that California, Oklahoma, and North Dakota
decline to enforce such agreements).

33.
34.

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 15(a).
85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898) ("Contracts that were in unreasonable

restraint of trade at common law were not unlawful in the sense of being

criminal ... but were simply void, and were not enforced by the courts. The effect
of the [A]ct of 1890 is to render such contracts unlawful in an affirmative or
positive sense .... " (citations omitted)).

35. Id. at 278-79; id. at 281-83 (describing standards governing the common
law's enforcement of ancillary restraints).

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
(1897).

Id. at 280-83.
Id. at 282-83.
Id. at 281.
Id. (quoting Mallan v. May (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 967 (Ex.)).
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 327-29
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Co., 41 the Court had already held that the Act did not reach
agreements that only burdened interstate commerce "indirectly."42
Shortly thereafter, the Court opined that a covenant ancillary to the
sale of a business "might not be included within the letter or spirit of
the statute in question." 43 The Court reaffirmed the importance of
the direct/indirect distinction in three 1898 decisions 44 and again in
Addyston Pipe itself.4 5 More importantly, the Court opined that, say,
a covenant ancillary to the sale of a business fell into the "indirect
As a result, the assessment of such
restraints" category. 46
agreements reverted to state courts, either applying contract law or,
perhaps, their own antitrust laws. 47
41. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
42. Id. at 16-17 (concluding that the Sherman Act was framed "in light of'
the Court's dual federalism jurisprudence); see also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1940) ("[T]he phrase 'restraint of trade' ... was made the
means of defining the activities prohibited. The addition of the words 'or
commerce among the several States' . .. was the means used to relate the
prohibited

restraint

of

trade

to

interstate

commerce

for

constitutional

purposes .... " (citation omitted)); Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Regulation and the
Federal-StateBalance: Restoring the OriginalDesign, 70 AM. U. L. REV. 75, 11415 (2020) [hereinafter Meese, Federal-State Balance] (contending that the
statutory term "in restraint of... commerce among the several States" drew from
the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence of dual federalism that preempted
state regulations that directly burdened interstate commerce); Alan J. Meese,
Justice Scalia and Sherman Act Textualism, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2013, 2016

(2017).
43. See Trans-MissouriFreightAss'n, 166 U.S. at 329.
44. See Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 615-16 (1898); Hopkins v.
United States, 171 U.S. 578, 587 (1898); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171
U.S. 505, 568-69 (1898); see also Meese, Federal-StateBalance, supra note 42, at
123-35 (recounting Court's repeated application of the direct/indirect standard

during this period).
45. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 228-29 (1899).
The word "ancillary" does not appear in the Supreme Court's opinion affirming
Taft's Addyston Pipedecision. Moreover, the Court reversed that portion of Taft's
judgment enjoining horizontal price fixing that produced only intrastate harm
and thus only impacted interstate commerce indirectly. Id. at 247-48.

46. See Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 567-68 (concluding that the Sherman Act
does not reach indirect restraints such as covenants ancillary to the sale of a

business); see also Cincinnati, Portsmouth, Big Sandy & Pomeroy Packet Co. v.
Bay, 200 U.S. 179, 184-85 (1906) (holding that covenant ancillary to the sale of
a ship exceeded the reach of the Sherman Act because the impact on interstate

commerce was "incidental").
47. For instance, the 1955 Report of the Attorney General's National
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws employs the term "ancillary" nineteen
times. U.S., ATT'Y GEN.'S NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST L., REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 27, 29,

77, 84, 86-88, 156, 174, 231, 238-39, 311 (1955). No such reference mentions
covenants ancillary to the sale of a business, covenants ancillary to an
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Of course, the Supreme Court would eventually reject the
"direct/indirect" distinction, holding instead that the Sherman Act
reached any restraint that produced a "substantial [economic] effect
upon interstate commerce . . . ."48 The exact import of this standard
was not initially clear; one could read the standard as requiring a
showing that the harmful effects themselves impose substantial
effects on interstate commerce."4 9 However, subsequent decisions
held that entirely harmless and indirect effects could count as
substantial and thus justify application of the Act, even where the
harm itself was confined to a single state. 50
In 1960, the leading scholarly assessment of employee
noncompete agreements reported that, despite "thousands of cases"
assessing such agreements, "the Sherman Act is apparently never
called into play against this traditional type of contract in restraint
of trade ... ."51 Thirteen years later, an antitrust scholar would refer
to such agreements as the "neglected stepchild" of federal antitrust
law, decrying the fact that such agreements had been the exclusive
concern of state contract law. 52 The author contended that the
Sherman Act was a "comprehensive charter of economic liberty,

employment relationship, covenants ancillary to the formation of a partnership,
covenants ancillary to the retirement of a partner, or covenants ancillary to the
sale of a chattel-the five types of ancillary restraints that Taft invoked in

Addyston Pipe. See id. at 281-82.
48. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 229-34 (1948); see also Meese, Federal-StateBalance, supra note 42, at 9295 (describing adoption of substantial effects test in Mandeville Island Farms).
49. See Meese, Federal-StateBalance, supra note 42, at 93 & n.73 ("Some
language in Mandeville Island Farms suggested that only harmful effects
counted as 'substantial' for purposes of the newly minted substantial effects test."
(quoting Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 234 ("[T]he vital question becomes
whether the effect is sufficiently substantial and adverse to Congress'[s]
paramount policy . .. to constitute a forbidden consequence."))).

50.

See, e.g., Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321-22 (1967) (per curiam)

(holding that the Sherman Act applied to intrastate conspiracy between liquor

wholesalers); United States v. Employing Plasterers' Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 188
(1954) (finding that agreement restricting entry into the Chicago plastering trade
substantially affected interstate commerce because plasterers purchased some
supplies from other states).

51. See Blake, supra note 20, at 628 & n.8 ("[T]he Antitrust Division has in
all likelihood never turned its attention to such agreements, and no trebledamage actions have been discovered among the reported thousands of cases.").

But see Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 717, 742-43 (1960) (disapproving
noncompete

agreements

imposed on travelling

salespeople also subject to

exclusive dealing agreements).
52. Goldschmid, supra note 5, at 1206 ("The Antitrust Division apparently
has not initiated suits in this area because of a belief that restrictive covenants
present issues of essentially local concern.").
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aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition . . .. "53 To justify
enhanced federal scrutiny of such agreements, this scholar and others
invoked post-1948 decisions that expanded the scope of the Sherman
Act to reach purely local restraints. 54 Another scholar elaborated on
these arguments, also contending that federal courts applying the
Sherman Act should adopt a more interventionist posture toward
such agreements than state courts had when applying their own
contract law. 55 Only in the 1970s and early 1980s did federal courts
begin applying the Sherman Act to traditional ancillary restraints,
including employee noncompete agreements. 56
Courts now assess such agreements under the fact-intensive Rule
of Reason applied to nearly all restraints that survive per se
Under this approach, parties challenging an
condemnation. 57
agreement must begin by establishing a prima facie case that the
agreement produces competitive harm. 58 Only then must proponents
of the restraint adduce evidence that the agreement produces
benefits, after which the challenger may contend that the restraint is
broader than necessary to achieve these objectives. 59 Nearly all Rule
of Reason cases fail because those who challenge the agreement

53. Id. at 1204 ("Simply stated, state courts are not dealing effectively with
the problems at hand. Local judges steeped in the intricacies of contract and real
estate law, impressed with the respectability of those seeking to enforce

restrictive covenants, and imbued with a sense that freedom of contract is a basic
value should almost invariably be upheld, have paid scant attention to the spirit
of the antitrust laws or to original common-law notions of restraint of trade....
But, taken cumulatively, there is untold harm being done. Still at issue is
whether the Sherman Act, 'designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition,' can be used to

reform the field." (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958))).
54. See id. at 1206 & nn. 82-83 (invoking Burke and Employing Plasterers'
Ass'n).

55. See Charles A. Sullivan, Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild" Antitrust
Treatment of Postemployment Restraints of Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 621, 647, 667
n.200 (1977).
56. See Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 264-69 (7th Cir.
1981); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1082 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[W]e
need not pass upon the general applicability of the federal antitrust laws to
postemployment restraints. Although such issues have not often been raised in
the federal courts, employee agreements not to compete are proper subjects for

scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act."); Bradford v. New York Times Co.,
501 F.2d 51, 59-60 (2d Cir. 1974).
57. See, e.g., Lektro-Vend, 660 F.2d at 265-68. Lower courts and the
enforcement agencies subject a very small fraction of agreements that survive

per se condemnation to the so-called "[Q]uick [L]ook." See Polygram Holding, Inc.
v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (articulating and applying this approach).
58. See, e.g., Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 827-28 (6th Cir. 2011).
59. Id.
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cannot make such a showing. 60 So far as this author is aware, no
federal court has condemned an employee noncompete agreement as
contrary to Section 1 of the Sherman Act in the past several decades.
Thus, state contract law, generated by a regime of competitive
federalism, sometimes articulates a more intrusive standard for
assessing such agreements than Sherman Act case law. 61
II. THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETE
AGREEMENTS

Numerous scholars, lawyers, and advocates at nonprofit think
tanks have expressed various levels of hostility toward employee
noncompete agreements.6 2 Some advocate wholesale abolition, while
others seek a more intrusive assessment of such agreements.6 3
Despite differences about the "bottom line," however, both
Abolitionists and those merely hostile to such agreements embrace
similar economic assumptions. One recent and comprehensive case
for abolishing such agreements took the form of a Petition for

60. See Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the
21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON 827, 827-29, 837 (2009) (finding that plaintiffs fail
to establish a prima facie case in 97 percent of rule of reason cases).
61. See generally Meese, Federal-State Balance, supra note 42, at 90-92

(describing how regime of competitive federalism once generated antitrust rules
applicable to local conduct); Alan J. Meese, Regulation of Franchisor
Opportunism and Production of the InstitutionalFramework:Federal Monopoly
or Competition Between the States?, 23 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 62-63 (1999)
[hereinafter Meese, FranchisorOpportunism].
62. See, e.g., MARK LEMLEY & ORLY LOBEL, DAY ONE PROJECT, SUPPORTING
TALENT MOBILITY AND ENHANCING HUMAN CAPITAL: BANNING NONCOMPETE
AGREEMENTS TO CREATE COMPETITIVE JOB MARKETS 2 (2021) (calling on national
government to "[b]ar] noncompete agreements through legislation or executive

order"); Alan Hyde, Should Noncompetes Be Enforced?: New Empirical Evidence
Reveals the Economic Harm of Non-Compete Covenants, REGULATION, Winter

2010-2011, at 7 ("[T]he nation would be better served by never enforcing
noncompetes."); Eric A. Posner, The Antitrust Challenge to Covenants Not to
Compete in Employment Contracts, 83 ANTITRUST L.J. 165, 167 (2020) (advocating

more intrusive scrutiny of such agreements); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al., The
American Experience with Employee Noncompete Clauses: Constraints on
Employees Flourish and Do Real Damage in the Land of Economic Liberty, 42
CoMPAR. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 101-04),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3870403. Professors Lobel
and Hyde are signatories of the Petition for Rulemaking. See Petition, supra note

7, at 59, 65.
63. Compare LEMLEY & LOBEL, supra note 62, at 2 (advocating complete
abolition), with Posner, supra note 62, at 167 (contending that such agreements
should be presumptively illegal under the Sherman Act, "allowing employers to
rebut the presumption if they can prove that the noncompetes they use will
benefit rather than harm their workers").
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Rulemaking filed with the FTC. 64 The Petition boasted forty-six
individual signatories, including leading academics and thought
leaders at public interest organizations, and nineteen signatures from
organizations, including the AFL-CIO and three other unions. 65 The
Petition asks the Commission to issue a rule banning all employee
noncompete agreements, including those that would survive scrutiny
under the Sherman Act and state law, as "unfair methods of
competition" and thus violative of Section 5 of the FTC Act. 66 The
Petition also contends that such agreements are inherently suspect
and therefore presumptively violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 67
Other scholars and advocates have also endorsed banning or severely
curtailing such agreements, often invoking the same or similar
arguments to those made in the Petition. 68
Filed in March 2019, the Petition languished. 69 However,
elections have consequences. On July 9, 2021, President Biden issued
an executive order designed to bolster competition throughout the
American economy. 70 Among other things, the order encouraged the
FTC "to curtail the use of unfair noncompete clauses .... " 71 He also
nominated Professor Lina Khan, a leader of the neo-Brandeisian
school of antitrust thought and a strong proponent of robust economic
regulation, to chair the Commission. 72 Before her nomination, Chair
Khan had expressed concern that antitrust law paid insufficient heed

64.
65.

Petition, supra note 7, at 1-5.
The other three unions are the Service Employees International Union,

United Food and Communications Workers, and UNITE HERE. Id. at 56, 58.
66. Id. at 4-5. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (banning "unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce").
67.

Petition, supra note 7, at 4-5. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying

text (describing this contention in greater detail).
68. See, e.g., LEMLEY & LOBEL, supra note 62, at 2 (advocating a ban on
noncompetes and suggesting in the alternative a ban on noncompetes entered by

low-wage employees); Posner, supra note 62, at 194 (contending that such
agreements should be presumptively illegal under the Sherman Act); Exec.
Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987, 36,992 (July 9, 2021) (encouraging the
FTC to consider "curtail[ing] the unfair use of non-compete clauses").
69. See Amanda Jaret & Sandeep Vaheesan, Non-Compete Clauses Are

Suffocating

American

Workers,

TIME

(Dec.

19,

2019,

3:40

PM),

(indicating
https://time.com/5753078/non-compete-clauses-american-workers/
that "[t]he current chairman of the Republican-majority FTC, Joseph Simons,
has expressed interest in the issue but taken no concrete steps toward initiating
a rulemaking").

70. Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. at 36,987.
71. Id. at 36,992.
72. See Cecilia Kang, Biden Nominates Lina Khan, a Vocal Critic of Big Tech,
to
the
F.T.C.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
22,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/22/business/lina-khan-ftc.html.
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to the impact of trade restraints on the welfare of employees. 73 On
August 5, 2021, less than two months after the Senate confirmed
Chair Khan, the Commission sought public comments on the
Petition. 74 The Commission's response to this Petition will serve as
an early test of the Biden administration's professed commitment to
abolishing practices that supposedly express employers' growing
The response will also test the
power in labor markets. 75
administration's professed embrace of science and evidence as
foundations of enlightened public policy. 76
The proposal to declare all such agreements to be methods of
unfair competition, regardless of actual market effect, rests upon
several interlocking economic assumptions-some empirical and
some theoretical-about the origins and impacts of such agreements.
This Article treats the Petition as a thorough exemplar of the case for
abolishing employee noncompete agreements. This Part summarizes
the Petition's main theoretical and empirical arguments for a rule
abolishing such agreements, noting when appropriate where those
who did not sign the Petition have embraced similar contentions.
First, the Petition asserts that employee noncompete
agreements are usually involuntary. 77 The Petition claims that
certain structural attributes of American labor markets confer
superior bargaining power on employers-power that employers use
to impose such agreements against employees' will. 78 The Petition
invokes three such structural attributes. 79 For instance, the Petition
contends that most local labor markets are highly concentrated as
defined by the Department of Justice and FTC Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, such that there is insufficient competition between
employers for employees' labor. 80 Moreover, the Petition asserts that

73. See Lina M. Khan, Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 791
(2017) (contending that doctrine governing alleged predatory pricing should
reflect "full range of interests that antitrust laws were enacted to safeguard-"
including "lower income and wages for employees").

74.
75.

See FTC Request for Public Comment, supra note 12.
See Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. at 36,987-88.

76.

See Memorandum on Restoring Trust in Government Through Scientific

Integrity and Evidence-Based Policymaking, 2021 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 96
(Jan. 27, 2021) ("It is the policy of my Administration to make evidence-based
decisions guided by the best available science and data. Scientific and
technological information, data, and evidence are central to the development and
iterative improvement of sound policies[.]").
77. See Petition, supra note 7, at 13-18.

78. Id. at 13-25.
79. Id. at 22 (summarizing these three attributes).
80. Id. at 13 ("To compound the weak position of workers, the employer side
of most local labor markets is highly concentrated."); id. at 17 ("On the employer
side, most local labor markets are highly concentrated, as defined by the [2010]
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission's Horizontal Merger
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most workers have few, if any, sources of unearned household income
and thus must sell their labor to employers to subsist. 81 Finally, very
few individuals belong to unions that would provide countervailing
bargaining power to offset the putative, overbearing power of
employers. 82 Taken together, these three factors supposedly confer
vastly superior bargaining power on employers-power employers
83
purportedly use to coercively impose noncompete agreements.
Second, the Petition identifies other purported defects in the
bargaining process that prevent meaningful negotiation over such
provisions, even when employers and employees occupy relatively
equal bargaining positions. 84 Like the supposed ubiquity of employer
power, these defects all constitute departures from what one might
call perfect competition in labor markets. 85 In particular, the Petition
asserts that prospective employees focus their scarce bargaining
effort, attention, and power on more central features of the bargain,
such as wages, hours, and benefits. 86 These aspects of the bargain
loom far larger than low-probability events such as post-employment
restraints on a former employee's autonomy. Recent developments in
behavioral economics, the Petition contends, suggest that potential
employees will unduly discount the relevance of such agreements
because they only apply in the unlikely event that an employee

Guidelines."); U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, 1819 (2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] (defining "highly

concentrated" markets as those with a Herfmdahl-Hirschman Index above
2,500).
81.

See Petition, supra note 7, at 2 ("Workers, who often depend on wages to

subsist, are usually at a significant disadvantage in their relationship with
employers."); id. at 13 ("Tens of millions of Americans generally have nothing to
sell but their labor and skills and so must work to subsist.").
82. Id. at 16-17 (reporting that fewer than 7 percent of private sector
workers are unionized).

83.

Id. at 18 ("Against this background of weak employees and strong

employers, workers are unlikely to be able to avoid non-compete clauses. Due to
their economic situation and the structure of labor markets in the United States,
most workers have little leverage in the hiring context. Consequently, they
typically must accept the terms of employment presented to them by
Under these circumstances, most workers must acquiesce to an
employers. ...
employer's insistence on a non-compete clause.").

84.

See, e.g., id. at 21 ("To the degree workers can and do bargain with

they are unlikely to focus on the existence of a non-compete
employers[,] ...
clause[,] [e]ven when they have some power at the hiring stage.").

85. Id. at 23-24 ("The conditions of contractual formation are very different
from the textbook theory of contract in which bargaining and negotiation are
preconditions of reaching agreement."). The Petition does not identify the
"textbook theory of contract" to which it refers.
86. Id. at 18-19.
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departs. 87 Finally, the Petition points out that some employers
further distort this process by deferring disclosure of such provisions
until after employees have accepted the offer of employment and a
given package of wages and benefits. 88 This tactic forces employees
to consider such provisions when they have minimal bargaining
power. In such cases, it seems that employers can obtain agreement
to such provisions without compensating employees for this
unanticipated restriction on their autonomy because employees are
unable to demand higher wages in return for "agreeing" to such
restrictions. 89

Taken together, the Petition says, these various attributes of
labor markets render all noncompete agreements "contracts of
adhesion" and not the results of "free bargaining" between the
parties. 90 The Petition also argues that employers "have broad power
to impose these restrictive agreements on workers." 9 1 Another
leading scholar contends that "workers and employers rarely bargain
over noncompetes," with the result that such agreements are
generally not exemplars of voluntary cooperation. 92

87. Id. at 18 ("Given these biases, any competition among employers for
workers likely focuses on the most salient dimensions of employment, such as
wages and benefits, and not on less salient terms such as non-compete clauses.");

see also Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note 62 (manuscript at 103) ("[F]ew of these
noncompetes are the result of bargained for exchange .... ").
88. See Petition, supra note 7, at 22-23 ("Some employers further tilt the
power imbalance in their favor by delaying presentation of the non-compete
clause to workers. They withhold the non-compete until after a worker has

accepted an offer of employment[.]"); see also Posner, supra note 62, at 185
("Workers often do not learn about noncompetes until after they start their
job .... "); Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note 62 (manuscript at 103) (contending that

"many" such agreements are imposed "after the job has been accepted and
without additional compensation").
89. See Posner, supra note 62, at 184 (explaining how, absent a "bargaining
failure," prospective employees will theoretically demand higher wages in return
for anticipated restraints on post-employment autonomy).
90. See Petition, supra note 7, at 13 ("Non-compete clauses function as
contracts of adhesion instead of products of free bargaining between employees
and employers. In general, the employee-employer relationship is defined by

inequality."); id. at 21 (defining "contracts of adhesion" "as documents that are
drafted as standard forms by one party and presented to the other party on a take
it-or-leave it basis").
91. See id. at 23 ("Because non-compete clauses function as contracts of
adhesion in an environment characterized by power disparities and behavioral
biases, employers have broad power to impose these restrictive agreements on

workers."); id. at 22 ("Due to power dynamics in labor markets and behavioral
biases among workers, market competition is unlikely to discipline employers'
use of non-compete requirements.").

92.

Posner, supranote 62, at 185.
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The Petition does not acknowledge any model of contract
formation that would explain how parties reach voluntary
agreements that create such enforceable, post-employment
restraints. Almost by default then (and perhaps inadvertently), the
Petition portrays the formation of such agreements as always the
result of some defect(s) in the bargaining process and thus never truly
voluntary. Others hostile to such agreements also decline to identify
any method of voluntary formation. 93 Given this premise, it is
perhaps no surprise that the Petition concludes that such agreements
are generally harmful and rarely, if ever, produce cognizable
benefits. 94 After all, if employees have no say in whether such
agreements bind them, there is no reason to presume that the
agreement maximizes the parties' joint welfare. 95
Third, the Petition asserts that such agreements impose
significant harm on individual employees and reduce overall wages. 96
An employee bound by such an agreement who receives a lucrative
offer from the employer's rival must either reject the offer or face the
prospect of a breach of contract action and resulting damages and/or
an injunction. 97 By locking employees into their current firm, the
Petition contends, such agreements severely limit an employee's
personal autonomy and ultimately prevent employees from receiving

the highest wages the market will pay for their services at that
moment in time. 98 To be sure, such employees would be entirely free
to accept a position not precluded by the noncompete agreement, e.g.,
with a firm in a different industry or geographic region not covered
by the agreement. But it stands to reason that, in many cases, a close
rival of the employer in the same geographic area will be the "highest
bidder" for the employee's services, especially if one includes the cost
that the employee must incur to move to a new home when calculating
the net wage offered by a distant potential employer. The harm
flowing from such agreements, the Petition continues, is compounded
by the proclivity of some employers to threaten to enforce such
93.

But see id. at 184-185 (discussing and rejecting theoretical possibility

that employers pay higher wages to compensate employees for "the expected

'hardship' cost of the noncompete-the probability of being deprived of a higher
wage from another employer").
94. See Petition, supra note 7, at 54.

95. This is an implication of Coase's insight that transaction costs can
prevent bargaining between parties that would otherwise eliminate market
failure resulting from inefficient externalities. Here, such externalities could
take the form of harm to employees and perhaps consumers if employees cannot

sell their labor to the highest bidder. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
96. Petition, supra note 7, at 26.
97. Id. at 27.
harm workers by
98. Posner, supra note 62, at 190 ("Noncompetes ...
depriving them of possible future offers.").
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agreements even if they are unenforceable in the relevant
jurisdiction. 99
The Petition also contends that employee noncompete
agreements can reduce competition in the product market by
preventing employees from selling their labor to new entrants or
other rivals or starting firms that compete with former employers. 1 00
Put another way, such agreements can raise the costs of an
incumbent firm's rivals, including rivals that do not yet exist, by
depriving them of access to important inputs-namely, the talent of
the employee. 101 Smaller firms, the Petition says, are more likely to
fall victim to such agreements, thereby fortifying the market power
of larger incumbent firms.' 0 2 Under this account, an employee
noncompete agreement can be analogous to an exclusive dealing or
tying agreement, whereby a manufacturer or franchisor deprives
rivals of important inputs or raises the prices of such inputs. This
forces rivals to raise their own prices and allows the perpetrator of
the agreement, who presumably has access to cheaper inputs, to price
above its (lower) costs. 103
Fourth, the Petition asserts that such agreements rarely, if ever,
create benefits relevant to the assessment of such contracts under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act or Section 5 of the FTC Act. 104 The
Petition describes whatever benefits that may exist as "intangible." 105
The Petition recognizes that such agreements can create the
equivalent of a property right, thereby allowing employers to capture
a larger share of their investments in producing information (such as
99. See Petition, supra note 7, at 53 ("The mere existence of non-compete
contracts, even when legally not binding, still inflicts real harms on workers.");

id. at 28-29 (explaining that employment contracts often include employee
noncompete agreements that are unenforceable within the relevant jurisdiction);
see also LEMLEY & LOBEL, supra note 62, at 3 n.20 (invoking findings of one study
concluding that noncompete agreements reduce average wages to justify banning

such agreements); Posner, supranote 62, at 187-88 (invoking findings of multiple
studies to justify more hostile treatment of noncompete agreements).
100. See Petition, supra note 7, at 37 ("[N]on-compete clauses can protect
dominant incumbents against competition in product and labor markets.
Incumbents can use non-compete clauses to tie up scarce labor and thereby
deprive current and would-be rivals of essential workers.").
101. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive

Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209,
230 (1986).
102. Petition, supranote 7, at 37 ("[N]on-competes can favor large incumbents
over small rivals.").

103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at 3 ("[N]on-competes do not have a credible justification.").
Id. at 39 ("The case for non-compete clauses presumes a need for

employers to protect their investment in intangibles through a quasi-property
right. These intangibles include trade secrets, customer lists, and employee
training.").
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trade secrets) and enhancing employees' human capital. 106 The
Petition also apparently recognizes that employers who bid away such
employees are sometimes free riding on such investments. 1 07
However, the Petition asserts that free riding is generally a good
thing and enhances society's welfare because it results in a "broad
dissemination of information and knowledge." 108 Indeed, the Petition
asserts that the argument for enforcement of employee noncompete
agreements presupposes that such "broad dissemination" is
"generally bad for society." 109 The Petition even attributes the
prosperity of California's Silicon Valley, in part, to the state's refusal
110
to enforce such agreements.

Put in terms familiar to antitrust lawyers, the Petition effectively
contends that the prevention of free riding and resulting investments
in employee training and the production of information do not count
as cognizable benefits or "redeeming virtues" that courts or agencies
should consider when assessing such restraints, either case-by-case
or as a group, under Section 1 or Section 5.111

106. Id.
107. Id. at 50 ("What is disparaged as free riding is often beneficial sharing of
information and knowledge among workers and across firms. While firms have
a motive to defend against perceived free riding by competitors, their private

incentive to protect intangibles can conflict with the public interest in allowing
the free dissemination and sharing of information and knowledge." (emphases
added)). The negative implication of the emphasized qualifications seems to be
that the prevention of free riding does not always "conflict with the public

interest." Id.
108. Id. at 41 ("What is disparaged as free riding often is the broad
dissemination of knowledge that contributes to economic growth and
innovation."); see also Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital

Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REv. 789, 845-47 (2015)
(articulating claim that unfettered mobility of labor will facilitate innovation and
economic growth, without regard to any resulting free riding).
109. Petition, supra note 7, at 3-4.
110. Petition, supra note 7, at 41-42; see also ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO
BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 67-70

(2013) (articulating this contention). But see Barnett & Sichelman, supra note
30, at 963-66 (articulating multifaceted critique of this contention).

111.

See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Pro. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-

95 (1978) (rejecting defendants' contention that propensity of restraint to
enhance quality of engineering services constituted cognizable benefit); Cont'l

T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-55, 58 (1977) (treating propensity
of restraint to overcome free riding and encourage promotion as a redeeming
virtue precluding per se condemnation); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States (NPR),
356 U.S. 1,

5 (1958) (restraints that restrict rivalry and cannot produce

"redeeming virtues" are unlawful per se); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416
F.3d 29, 37-38 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (assessing whether purported benefit was
cognizable under Section 1 and Section 5); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 102124 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting defendants' contention that certain purported
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Fifth, the Petition asserts that, to the extent such agreements
produce benefits, there are less restrictive means of achieving such
objectives. 1 2 The Petition invokes three such alternatives.1 13 For
instance, firms can enter nondisclosure agreements that prevent
former employees from revealing sensitive information to new
employers." 4 Moreover, firms can adopt more generous salaries and
benefits, retaining such individuals without relying upon noncompete
agreements. 1 5 Finally, the parties can enter long-term employment
contracts, allowing firms to recoup investments in training without
restricting employees' post-employment freedom of action.11 6 Unlike
noncompete agreements, which the Petition characterizes as "onesided obligations," under such long-term agreements, "both the
employer and the employee make a binding commitment in an
employment contract."11 7 Indeed, the FTC's solicitation of public
comments, inspired by the Petition, implied that it has already
decided that employee noncompete agreements are "one-sided
contract terms."118

Taken together, these considerations purportedly justify banning
all such agreements as unfair methods of competition within the
meaning of Section 5 of the FTC Act. The Petition also contends that
all employee noncompete agreements are "inherently suspect" under
the Sherman Act and thus governed by Section 1's "Quick Look." 119
While nominally less drastic than outright condemnation under
Section 5, a declaration that a restraint is "inherently suspect"
benefits were cognizable and thus relevant to assessment of challenged restraint
under the Rule of Reason).
112. Petition, supra note 7, at 49.

113.

Id.

114.

See id. at 47 ("Employers can also condition employment on employees'

signing non-disclosure agreements... . [which] are less restrictive than noncompetes.").
115. Id. ("Employers can retain workers, and ensure their commitment and
loyalty, through higher wages and salaries, more generous benefits, and fair
treatment."); see also Hyde, supra note 62, at 10 ("[E]mployers who are
unprotected by any legal means of frustrating employee mobility have a simple
solution to the problem: they could pay the employee not to leave.").
116. Petition, supra note 7, at 48; see also Sullivan, supra note 55, at 639-40
(suggesting such an alternative).

117.
118.

Petition, supra note 7, at 48.
See FTC Request for Public Comment, supra note 12 (referring to "non-

compete clauses that prevent workers from seeking employment with other firms,
and other one-sided contract terms that may exacerbate or lock in power

disparities").
119.

Petition, supra note 7, at 4 (arguing that such agreements "should be

presumptively illegal under the Sherman Act"); id. at 4 & n.6 (arguing that such
agreements are "inherently suspect owing to [their] likely tendency to suppress

competition" (quoting Polygram Holding, Inc., 136 F.T.C. 310, 344 (2003), petition
denied, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005))).
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constitutes de facto condemnation in the real world, given that
defendants never rebut the Quick Look's presumption that such
restraints produce net harm. 120 Indeed, if the Petition is correct that
there is always a less restrictive means of achieving any benefits
produced by such agreements, efforts to overcome a presumption
against them will invariably fail. After all, challengers could always
rebut any proof that such restraints produce benefits by invoking the
If so, designation of such
availability of such alternatives. 121
be the functional equivalent
would
suspect"
as
"inherently
restraints
administrative expense
the
greater
at
albeit
of per se condemnation,
results in
predictably
which
adjudication,
of case-by-case
condemnation.
Abolitionists and others hostile to noncompetes have instanced
certain real-world agreements that supposedly exemplify such
contracts and illustrate the case against them.12 2 For instance,
franchisees of the sandwich franchisor Jimmy John's once obtained
such agreements from their employees, precluding them from
working at shops selling similar sandwiches (but not all fast-food
restaurants) within three miles of any Jimmy John's location for two
years after departing from the franchisee. 12 3 Abolitionists and others
have uniformly criticized this agreement, and Jimmy John's relented
124
after the public outcry and threats from state attorneys general.
Abolitionists have invoked other examples of such agreements that,
125
like the Jimmy John's agreement, bind low-income workers.

120. See Alan J. Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories:
Why Antitrust Law Should Reject the Quick Look, 104 GEO. L.J. 835, 870-71
(2016).
121. See Polygram Holding, Inc., 136 F.T.C. 310, 349 (2003), petition denied,
416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("The plaintiff may also show that the proffered
procompetitive effects could be achieved through means less restrictive of
competition.").
122. See infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.

123.

See Petition, supra note 7, at 7-8 (invoking this as a representative

example of noncompete agreements); see also Orly Lobel, Boilerplate Collusion:
Clause Aggregation, Antitrust Law and Contract Governance, 106 MINN. L. REV.
877, 913 (2021) (treating Jimmy John's agreement as exemplar of agreement
adopted-"for illegitimate reasons"); Posner, supra note 62, at 165 (beginning
article by invoking the Jimmy John's example); Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note
62 (manuscript at 5) (quoting and invoking this agreement as an exemplar). A
search of the HeinOnline law review database reveals over four dozen articles
that invoke this contract in connection with an assessment of noncompete
agreements.

124.

See Press Release, Lisa Madigan, Illinois Attorney General, Madigan

Sues Jimmy John's for Imposing Unlawful

Non-Compete Agreements

on

Sandwich
Makers
and
Delivery
Drivers
(June
8,
2016),
https://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2016_06/20160608.html.
125. See infra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
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III. EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS ARE NONSTANDARD
CONTRACTS

Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson posited a distinction between
126
"classical market contracting" and "nonstandard contracts."
Applying this taxonomy to a relationship between a manufacturer
and a dealer, for instance, classical agreements simply mediate the
passage of title from seller to buyer, without any post-transaction
restriction on either. 12 7 Such agreements presumably include terms
such as price, quantity, and date of delivery. 128 A typical example
129
might be a shoe manufacturer's sale of shoes to independent stores.
Nonstandard contracts, on the other hand, both mediate passage
of title and, in addition, include terms that limit the post-transaction
autonomy of one or both parties. 1 30 Such agreements generally arise
in a setting of relational contracting, where one or both parties make
investments specific to the relationship, and performance unfolds

126. See Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 177,
185 (1985) (describing "classical market contracting" as "the discrete contracting
ideal"); id. at 188 (explaining the "[c]lassical market exchange-whereby [a]

&

product is sold at a uniform price to all comers without restriction .... ").
127. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 68 (1985) (describing classical
"discrete transaction paradigm" whereby transactions are "sharp in by clear
agreement; sharp out by clear performance"); id. at 69 & n.1 (stating that such
transactions correspond to the 'ideal' market transaction in economics" whereby
"the participants trade a standardized contract such that each unit of the contract
is a perfect substitute for any other unit.... The organized market itself or some
other institution deliberately creates a homogenous good that can be traded
anonymously by the participants or their agents." (quoting Lester G. Telser

Harlow N. Higinbotham, Organized Future Markets: Costs and Benefits, 85 J.
POL. ECON. 969, 997 (1977))).
128. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance: Framework and
Implications, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 195, 202 (1984)
("Neoclassical transactions take place within markets where 'faceless buyers and
sellers .. . meet ...

for an instant to exchange standardized goods at equilibrium

prices .... ' (quoting Yoram Ben-Porath, The F-Connection:Families, Friends,
and Firms and the Organization of Exchange, 6 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 1, 4
(1980))).
129. E.g., In re Brown Shoe Co., 62 F.T.C. 679, 703-20 (1963) (evaluating
distribution arrangement whereby manufacturer sold shoes to most retailers

with no post-sale restraint), aff'd, 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
130. See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics: The Governance
of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 250 (1979) (describing
"nonstandardized transactions" whereby the "nature of these transactions makes

primary reliance on market governance hazardous"); Oliver E. Williamson,
Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV.
519, 528-29 (1983) [hereinafter Williamson, Credible Commitments] (describing
"nonstandard [and] unfamiliar contracting practices" as methods of minimizing

"hazards" of particular transactions).
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over time under uncertainty. 131 Such investments, in turn, can place
one or both parties at risk of opportunism by the other, making
classical market contracting "hazardous." 132 The typical nonstandard
agreement accompanied the sale of a manufactured good to a
retailer. 133 A manufacturer might sell dealers products on the
contractual condition that they confine their selling efforts to a
particular geographic area (an exclusive territory) and/or decline to
purchase products from other manufacturers (exclusive dealing).134
The classical/nonstandard dichotomy can also apply to the
purchase and sale of labor. A "classical" labor contract would entail
an exchange of wages for a certain amount and quality of work under
the "direction" of the employer. 135 Once the work is complete and the
wage paid, the "transaction" is complete, and the contract that
supported it places no ongoing constraint on either party. 136 By
contrast, a nonstandard labor agreement could also include, say, a
restriction on the employee's commercial autonomy during the term
of employment. 137 Such an agreement could also include a restriction
on the autonomy of a (former) employee after he or she departs, that
131.

See Williamson, supranote 126, at 182 (describing scenario in which "full

productive values are realized only in the context of an ongoing relation between
the original parties to a transaction. . . . Parties who are engaged in a trade that
is supported by nontrivial investments in transaction-specific assets are

effectively operating in a bilateral trading relation with one another"); id. at 18586 (articulating schema of contracting whereby presence of relationship-specific
investments induces parties to adopt "protective safeguards" in the form of
nonstandard contracts and other practices).

132.

Id. at 184-85 (discussing how combination of bounded rationality and

asset specificity can induce opportunism); id. at 185 (explaining how "unassisted
market governance poses hazards" in such settings).
133. See, e.g., id. at 187 (observing that "[n]onstandard forms of contractingcustomer and territorial restrictions, tie-ins, block booking, franchise

restrictions, resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing, and the like-are of
special interest" to practitioners of industrial organization).

134.

See id. at 203 (treating exclusive territories as exemplar of nonstandard

contracting subject to transaction cost analysis).

135.

See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 396 (1937)

(describing how entrepreneurs "organi[ze]" certain "transactions within the

firm"); id. at 391 (describing employment relationship as an employee's
agreement to accept direction from the employer in return for compensation); id.
("The contract is one whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration . . . agrees to

obey the directions of an entrepreneur within certain limits.") (emphasis in
original).
136. Cf. Williamson, supra note 126, at 185 (describing "classical market
contracting").

137.

By analogy, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act implies such a

restriction on the activities of partners by default. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §
409(b)(3) (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2013) (articulating duty "to
refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the partnership's

business before the dissolution of the partnership").
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is, after the main transaction between the parties-money for laborhas ended. 138 These agreements have their impact when individuals
are no longer employed by the firm. This agreement between once
and future independent entities is "nonstandard" because it does
more than simply mediate the terms of the employment transaction
between the parties. 139 Moreover, like nonstandard distribution
agreements, employee noncompete agreements constrain one party to

the agreement, the employee, after the main transaction.
IV. NONSTANDARD CONTRACTS AND THE INHOSPITALITY TRADITION

The recognition that employee noncompete agreements are
nonstandard contracts provides some historical perspective and
allows for a well-informed assessment of the case for abolition. Such
agreements are not the first nonstandard contracts to endure scrutiny
by the nation's expert enforcement agencies. The misguided approach
these agencies and courts took to various other nonstandard
agreements serves as a cautionary tale.
The Inhospitality Tradition Treated NonstandardContracts as
A.
Anticompetitive Restraints That Produced No Cognizable Benefits
During antitrust's "inhospitality era," 140 scholars, agencies, and
courts repeatedly expressed hostility to nonstandard agreements,
including those between manufacturers and dealers, even when such
agreements reduced consumer prices and/or apparently enhanced
interbrand rivalry. 14 1 The FTC itself sometimes led the way in
condemning such agreements, and the Supreme Court adopted the
Commission's approach. 14 2 Scholars, enforcers, and, by derivation,
138. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir.
1898) (describing examples of such provisions).
139. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text (describing and defining
nonstandard agreements).

140. See Williamson, Credible Commitments, supra note 130, at 535
(describing origins of antitrust's inhospitality tradition).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 611-12 (1972)
(declaring apparently ancillary agreements between independent grocery stores
unlawful per se despite district court's determination that such agreements

enhanced interbrand rivalry); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153-54 (1968)
(declaring maximum resale price maintenance unlawful per se despite reduction

in consumer prices), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
142. See, e.g., In re Brown Shoe Co., 62 F.T.C. 679, 715-17 (1963) (condemning
quasi-exclusive dealing agreements binding 1 percent of nation's shoe retailers),

aff'd, 384 U.S. 316 (1966); In re Sandura Co., 61 F.T.C. 756, 809-14 (1962)
(condemning exclusive territories obtained by small manufacturer), rev'd, 339

F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); In re Snap-On Tools Corp., 59 F.T.C. 1035, 1046-49
(1961) (condemning exclusive territories obtained by tool manufacturer in

competitive market), rev'd, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963). Although federal courts
of appeal reversed two of these decisions, the Supreme Court endorsed the
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jurists, drew upon the branch of economic science known as industrial
organization, which was simply applied price theory. 143 These actors
emphasized that such agreements restricted competition and the
autonomy of trading partners. 144 They also claimed that such
agreements almost never produced cognizable efficiencies, i.e.,
redeeming virtues, even if they predictably increased the output of
According to the
advertising and promotion, for instance.1 45
Department of Justice, efficiencies arising after transfer of title were
not "comparable" to those (technological) efficiencies that arose
within firms. 46 Others claimed that what some called free riding was
simply a form of aggressive competition that forced full-service
dealers to engage in price competition with no-frills dealers. 147 While
such competition could cause full-service dealers to reduce
promotional efforts, this reduction was purportedly a manifestation
of a well-functioning market that properly registered consumer
preferences. 148 Indeed, some price theorists were outright hostile to
Commission's approach shortly thereafter. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn

& Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967) (banning vertical exclusive territories as unlawful
per se), overruled by Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
143. See Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 115; see also id. at 115 n.196 (collecting several
authorities from this period to this effect).

144. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966) (opining that
challenged exclusive dealing agreement "conflicts with the central policy of both
§ 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act against contracts which take
away freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market"); Snap-On Tools, 59 F.T.C.
at 1047 (condemning vertically imposed exclusive territories because "'[p]laying
off one dealer against another" in respondent's products "is the essence of
competition"); id. at 1047-48 (holding that such restraints "have the same
destructive effects on competition as the horizontal allocations of territory
condemned in [Addyston Pipe] and are no less unlawful" (citation omitted));

Williamson, Credible Commitments, supra note 130, at 535 (explaining that,
within the inhospitality tradition: "[]egitimate market transactions will be
signal
relations
contractual
restrictive
entirely by price;
mediated
anticompetitive intent"); see also Meese, supra note 143, at 115-23 (describing
price theory's hostile interpretation of nonstandard agreements and resulting
preference for atomistic competition).

145.

Cf. Williamson, supra note 130, at 535 ("The inhospitality tradition is

supported by the widespread view that economic organization is technologically

determined. Economies of scale and technological nonseparabilities explain the
organization of economic activity within firms. All other activity is appropriately

organized by market exchanges.").
146. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 50, Schwinn, 388 U.S. 365 (No.
25).
147. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case
for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical PriceFixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1492-93 (1983)
(articulating this contention).

148. Id. at 1493; see also Brief for Petitioners at 56-57, Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (No. 76-15), 1976 WL 181221, at *56-57 (same);
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advertising and promotion, contending that such efforts induced
unjustified product differentiation, reduced interbrand competition,
149
This position
and thus enhanced manufacturers' market power.
followed naturally from price theory's assumption that economic
efficiencies were technological in origin (e.g., economies of scale) and
thus naturally arose within the boundaries of the firm, before the sale
of the manufacturer's product to a dealer or consumer. 150
Courts, scholars, and enforcers sometimes grudgingly recognized
that some nonstandard contracts could produce ostensible
efficiencies. 151 But these advocates also asserted that parties could
achieve any efficiencies via less restrictive alternatives, including
5 2
For
sometimes relying on an unconstrained atomistic market.
and
advertising
instance, some argued that if consumers value
promotion, a "market will develop to supply them and a separate price
Brief for the United States at 24, White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253
(1963) (No. 54) ("[T]he proportion of time, money and effort to be devoted to interbrand rather than intra-brand competition, and to each of the inducements

offered by sellers to buyers, is to be determined by the free decisions of individual
sellers, not by agreements between a manufacturer and its purchasers[.]");
LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 414 (1977)

("If sizable numbers of customers use the display facilities of the high-priced
dealer to shop and then buy from the low-priced dealer, the high-priced dealer
will respond by cutting its display services and its prices. This is what should
happen.").

149.

See Brief of the Small Business Legal Defense Committee as Amicus

Curiae in Support of Respondent at 23-24, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.

Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 381, at
*23-24 (arguing that suppliers employ resale price maintenance to further
differentiate their products, augmenting their market power); Reply Brief for the

United States at 16, Schwinn, 388 U.S. 365 (No. 25) (contending that product
differentiation from additional dealer sales effort could raise barriers to entry,
reducing interbrand competition); William S. Comanor, Vertical Territorialand
Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419,

1427 (1968).
150. See Williamson, Credible Commitments, supra note 130, at 535; see also
Brief for the United States, supra note 146, at 50 (asserting that contractually
obtained exclusive territories could not produce "comparable economies" to those

arising within firms that integrated forward into distribution).
151. See Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman
Act: Conscious Parallelismand Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV. 655, 698-99
(1962) (recognizing that manufacturer "facing ample competition at his level [i.e.,
significant interbrand competition]" may use exclusive territories "to induce or
compel his selected dealers to develop their respective local market more
intensively"). Turner suggested that more intensive market development would
reduce prices. Id. at 699. However, the eventual argument that vertical exclusive
territories overcome a market failure and thus increase promotion implied that
prices would rise after such promotion increased consumer demand for the
manufacturer's product. See Meese, supra note 143, at 149-52.

152.

See Turner, supra note 151, at 699.
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will be charged."1 53 As a result, contractual restrictions on dealers
nominally designed to induce such promotion were deemed
unnecessarily restrictive of rivalry and thus supposedly injured
consumers and unduly restricted dealer autonomy. 154 Moreover, the
FTC, joined by the Department of Justice, advised the Supreme Court
that, if purchasing exclusively from one supplier produced
efficiencies, dealers would be "eager" unilaterally to confine their
purchases to individual manufacturers, with the result that there was
no "need [for] restrictions on [dealers'] freedom of choice in order to
achieve efficiency . . . ."155 Finally, before he led the Antitrust
Division, Donald Turner contended that manufacturers could achieve
the legitimate objectives of vertical exclusive territories by "assigning
each dealer a territory of primary responsibility which he agrees to
use his best efforts to develop," while still allowing dealers to sell
wherever they pleased. 156 Jurists, agencies, and other scholars also
endorsed such provisions as alternatives that would produce the same

153. Comanor, supra note 149, at 1433; see also JOEL B. DIRLAM & ALFRED E.
KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST POLICY 185
(1954) ("[I]t is difficult to see why many of the mutual benefits and socially
beneficent consequences of exclusive dealing require coercion [i.e., contractual
requirement] for their achievement."); SULLIVAN, supra note 148, at 414; Derek
C. Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements

Under the Clayton Act, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 267, 307 ("[I]f a strong and legitimate
business need for exclusive selling actually does exist, it is strange that dealers
will not follow this policy without being compelled to do so by contract, for the
advantages that result should benefit them as well as the [manufacturer].").

154. See Comanor, supra note 149, at 1433.
155. Brief for the Federal Trade Commission at 30, FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.,
384 U.S. 316 (1966) (No. 118), 1966 WL 100464, at 30. See id. at 29-30 ("[E]ven
if it were supposed that complete line concentration was the most efficient
approach, one would expect that retailers would be eager to achieve the attendant
economies and would not have to be held to the line by contractual agreement.
As the Commission concluded, '[w]hile line concentration itself may or may not

be economically justifiable, there is no economic justification for making the
adherence to this doctrine the subject of agreement between buyer and seller and
enforcing the agreement to the latter's advantage.' Independent shoe dealers do

not need restrictions on their freedom of choice in order to achieve efficiency[.]"
(citation omitted)).
156. Turner, supranote 151, at 699; Mark J. Niefer, Donald F. Turner at the
Antitrust Division: A Reconsiderationof Merger Policy in the 1960s, ANTITRUST,
Summer 2015, at 53 (noting President Johnson nominated and appointed Turner
to serve as Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust at the U.S. Department of

Justice). The Commission itself endorsed the same alternative when condemning
exclusive territories. See In re Snap-On Tools Corp., 59 F.T.C. 1035, 1048-49
(1961) ("There is nothing to prevent Snap-On from assigning areas of primary
responsibility to its dealers and insisting that they provide adequate sales

coverage and service within these territories."), rev'd, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir.
1963).
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Others asserted that
benefits as exclusive territories. 157
dealers over which
with
manufacturers could negotiate directly
promotional services dealers should provide, thereby obviating the
need for any contractual mechanisms to assure adequate
promotion. 158

The InhospitalityAccount Maintained that Firms Used Market
B.
Power to Impose Nonstandard Contractson Trading Partners
The inhospitality era's account of nonstandard contracts also
implied a related account of contract formation. Scholars claimed
that manufacturers employed economic power to impose nonstandard
agreements against the will of dealers and others. 159 These experts
157. See Earl E. Pollock, Alternative DistributionMethods After Schwinn, 63
NW. U. L. REV. 595, 604 & n.44 (1968) (collecting numerous consent judgments
approving primary responsibility clauses in place of exclusive territories); see also

White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 271 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (invoking "assignment of areas of primary responsibility" as possible
less restrictive means of achieving same benefits as nonprice vertical restraints);

United States v. Topco Assocs., 1973-1 Trade Cas. ¶ 74,485 at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1973)
(approving such clauses in place of horizontal ancillary exclusive territories),

aff'd, 414 U.S. 801 (1973); Brief for Petitioners, supra note 148, at 49-50; Brief
for the United States at 20-21, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967)
(No. 9), 1966 WL 100610, at *20-21 (contending that such clauses are less
restrictive means of achieving the objective of ancillary horizontal exclusive
territories); Brief for the United States, supra note 148, at 24-25 (quoting Turner,

supra note 151, at 699); Martin B. Louis, Vertical DistributionalRestraints Under
Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argument for the Continuing Use of a PartialPer Se

Approach, 75 MICH. L. REV. 275, 305 (1976); Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case:
Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25
(1978) ("'[P]rimary responsibility' clauses should satisfy the suppliers' interests
adequately."); Turner, supra note 151, at 699; Robert G. Parker, Note, Restrictive

DistributionArrangements After the Schwinn Case, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 514, 525
(1968).
158. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, supra note 148, at 26 (explaining
that manufacturers can contractually "regulate the location and appearance of
showrooms, the maintenance of adequate repair and service facilities, the
employment of courteous, skilled and trained sales personnel, the compliance

with local laws and regulations, the maintenance of good credit ratings or the
assumption of primary responsibility for sales coverage for specified areas and
classes of customers"); SULLIVAN, supranote 148, at 416 ("The manufacturer can
expressly require every dealer to provide whatever display, service or other
facility, or whatever commitment to local promotional activity the manufacturer
regards as needed."); Pitofsky, supra note 147, at 1493 ("If a manufacturer really

wants additional advertising, the common commercial practice is to contract
separately for it.").
159. See, e.g., DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note

153, at 185 (characterizing

exclusive dealing requirements as resulting from "coercion"); J.R. Gould & B.S.
Yamey, ProfessorBork on Vertical PriceFixing, 76 YALE L.J. 722, 727 (1967) ("In
short, a programme of r.p.m. in practice does not involve the voluntary agreement
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had no alternative explanation for the origins of such agreements.
For instance, in their monograph on antitrust policy, economists Carl
Kaysen and Donald Turner offered such an account of tying
contracts. 160 They pointed out that buyers prefer flexibility regarding
whether to purchase the seller's version of the tied product. 16 1 As a
result, they said, sellers must employ some market power, no matter
how slight, to impose such restrictions on purchasers. 6 2 Kaysen and
Turner acknowledged that some tying contracts arose in competitive
markets.1 63 Still, they dismissed such agreements as "random small
transactions of no consequence."1 64 Those familiar with the work of
Thomas Kuhn on the progress of science and scientific discovery will
recognize this dismissal as a tacit concession that such agreements
were "anomalies" within the then-extant scientific paradigm. 165 Such
anomalies sometimes induce scientists to rethink the conceptual
apparatus they employ to interpret natural phenomena.1 66 However,
Kaysen and Turner "stuck to their guns." Tying agreements were not
the only nonstandard agreements that arose in competitive
markets.1 67

Antitrust doctrine reflected identical economic assumptions
For
regarding the process of forming nonstandard contracts.
instance, the Court condemned tying agreements as unlawful per
se.1 68 While the Court purported to require a showing of economic
power over the tying product as a condition of such summary
condemnation, it found such power in any departure from perfect
of all parties affected, but does involve the 'supervision' and overriding by the
manufacturer of the 'normal business judgment' of others."); see also Friedrich

Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943) (treating monopoly and uniform adoption of terms
by all sellers in the market as equivalent indications of bargaining power, and
claiming that, therefore, uniform adoption of a contractual provision in a
competitive market rendered a dealer's agreement involuntary); Jerrold G. Van
Cise, Franchising-FromPower to Partnership, 15 ANTITRUST BULL. 443, 443

(1970) (characterizing franchisors as "medieval feudal lord[s] holding the power
of economic life and death over enfranchised serfs").
160. CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS 157 (1959).

161. See id.
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. Id. at 159.
165. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 52-65
(4th ed. 2012) (titling Chapter VI "Anomaly and the Emergence of Scientific
Discoveries").
166. Id.
167. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (collecting decisions
condemning nonstandard distribution restraints that arose in competitive
markets).

168.

See NPR, 356 U.S. at 5-8.
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competition, including product differentiation nominally conferred by
Lower courts invoked such logic to hold that
copyrights. 1 69
trademarks conferred sufficient power. 170 The Court even opined that
the mere existence of a tie itself gave rise to a presumption that the
Some lower courts allowed
seller used power to impose it.171
defendants to "justify" such agreements. 172 However, even if a
defendant established that a tie produced significant benefits, a
plaintiff would still prevail if it could establish that there was a less
173
This "less
restrictive means of achieving the same objective.
that any
assumption
on
the
restrictive alternative" test rested
benefits necessarily coexisted with anticompetitive harm-namely,
the use of power to "force" such agreements on the purchaser. 174
Similar assumptions informed other aspects of antitrust doctrine
during this period. For instance, the traditional equitable doctrine of
in pari delicto precluded parties from challenging agreements into
which they had entered.1 75 During the inhospitality era, the Court
declined to employ this doctrine to bar suits by dealers challenging
exclusive dealing agreements, exclusive territories, minimum resale
price maintenance, and tying contracts. 176 The Court reasoned that

169.
170.

See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48 (1962).
Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 48 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding

that franchisor possessed economic power because of its attractive trademark and

ability to charge above-market prices for tied product); Siegel v. Chicken Delight,
Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 49 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that attractive trademark conferred
economic power sufficient to establish per se violation), abrogated by Rick-Mik.
Enters. v. Equilon Enters., 532 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2008).
171. See NPR, 356 U.S. at 7-8 ("The very existence of this host of tying
arrangements is itself compelling evidence of the defendant's great power, at
least where, as here, no other explanation has been offered for the existence of
these restraints."); see also Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45 & n.4 (concluding that no
market definition was necessary to determine whether defendants possessed
sufficient economic power because tying products were copyrighted).

172. See Carpa, 536 F.2d at 46-47.
173. See Siegel, 448 F.2d at 51.
174. See Alan J. Meese, The Market Power Model of Contract Formation:How
Outmoded Economic Theory Still DistortsAntitrust Doctrine, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1291, 1308 (2013) [hereinafter Meese, Market Power and Contract
Formation]; cf. Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics:

Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 85 (1997) [hereinafter
Meese, Tying Meets the New InstitutionalEconomics] (explaining that, where less
restrictive alternatives are less effective, there is no reason to presume that tie
is the result of anticompetitive forcing).

175. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 137-40
(1968), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467
U.S. 752 (1984).
176. See, e.g., id. (entertaining challenge to such agreements); id. at 139
(finding that franchisees' "participation" in these agreements "was not voluntary"
because they had to accept

onerous

terms in order to obtain franchise
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dealers' participation in such agreements was the result of
franchisors' unequal bargaining power and thus involuntary. 177 This
was so, the Court said, even though the dealers actively sought some
of the provisions. 178 Nor did the Court identify any relevant market
The Court
where the defendants supposedly possessed power.
embraced similar economic logic when evaluating claims that
challenged vertical restraints were consignments and not concerted
action, holding that any consignment was in fact a "coercive device"
that restricted the autonomy of dealers. 179 In short, neither courts
nor economists recognized any voluntary means of obtaining
agreement to nonstandard contracts.
V. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETE
AGREEMENTS ARE GENERALLY THE RESULT OF UNEQUAL BARGAINING
POWER OR SOME OTHER DEFECT IN THE BARGAINING PROCESS

In a well-functioning market, prospective employees will demand
additional compensation in return for entering a noncompete
agreement, given that such a contract will restrict employees' ability
"to access more lucrative outside employment options during the term
of the" agreement. 180 These wage demands will induce employers to
internalize the prospective costs that the provision imposes on such

opportunities); id. at 143 (White, J., concurring) ("[D]efendant's superior
bargaining power led to plaintiff's participation in the unlawful arrangement.");
id. (concluding that the "illegal arrangement ... was thrust on [petitioners]").
177. Id. at 139 (majority opinion); see also Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145, 150 & n.6 (1968) (finding Section 1 agreement between manufacturer and
dealer from moment that latter "unwillingly complied" with the price ceiling
imposed by the manufacturer), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3

(1997); William B. Bohling, Franchise Terminations Under the Sherman Act:
Populism and Relational Power, 53 TEX. L. REV. 1180, 1184 (1975) (describing
doctrine condemning such practices as "reflecting a judicial intolerance to the
coercive use of superior bargaining power").
178. See PermaLife, 392 U.S. at 139 (noting that franchisees "eagerly [sought]

more franchises and more profits," but holding that "their participation was not
voluntary in any meaningful sense" because "they did not actively seek each and
every clause of the agreement").
179. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of California, 377 U.S. 13, 16-17 (1964)
(describing consignment agreement setting minimum resale prices as "coercive
device" that "depriv[ed] independent dealers of the exercise of free judgment
whether to become consignees at all, or remain consignees, and, in any event, to
sell at competitive prices"); id. at 21 ("[D]ealers are coercively laced into an
arrangement under which their supplier is able to impose noncompetitive prices
...
[that] otherwise might be competitive.").
180. Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 30, at 1036; see also Richard A. Epstein,
The Application of Antitrust Law to Labor Markets-Then and Now, 15 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 327, 338 (2022).
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As a result, employers would only adopt such
employees. 181
provisions if the benefits, e.g., higher productivity resulting from
enhanced training, exceeded the employee's anticipated costs,
reflected in higher wages. 182 The employer's payment of premium
wages that induce such an agreement thereby shares with employees
the gains that such contracts make possible. 183
However, as explained above, Abolitionists contend that
employment markets do not function properly. 184 Instead, they
contend that employers generally use superior bargaining power or
informational advantages to foist employee noncompete agreements
upon unwilling employees. 185 By implication, then, there is no reason
to presume that such agreements produce benefits that exceed the
harm imposed on purchasers. Instead, according to Abolitionists, all
or nearly all such agreements do more harm than good and are thus
suboptimal. 186
This account of the formation of such agreements echoes claims
during the inhospitality era that manufacturers employed economic
power to impose nonstandard agreements on dealers. 187 Unlike
inhospitality era scholars, however, Abolitionists have offered
empirical evidence to support their claim of widespread coercion. In
particular, Abolitionists invoke a recent study, finding that most
American labor markets are highly concentrated as defined by the
Department of Justice and FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 188 As

181.

See generally Coase, supra note 95, at 6-8 (explaining that a party's

willingness to pay counterparty to alter its activity will cause the latter to
internalize the cost of its actions in a setting with low transaction costs). Of
course, the employee's own assessment of cost would also incorporate any benefits
of such enhanced productivity, which the employee could capture in the form of

higher wages earned from current and/or future employers. If this effect is large
enough, it would seem that the employee need not receive an immediate wage
premium to enter such an agreement. Id.

182.

See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 30, at 1037-38. It should be noted

that the private "benefits" of such agreements may take the form of
supracompetitive profits resulting from the use of such agreements to "rais[e]
rivals' costs." See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 101, at 239-40. In these
circumstances, employers will share a portion of such profits via higher wages.

See infra notes 343-45 and accompanying text.
183.

See Evan P. Starr et al., Noncompete Agreements in the US Labor Force,

64 J.L. & ECON. 53, 75 (2021) ("[N]oncompete agreements are associated with
positive differentials in wages and training.").

184.

See supra notes 77-94 and accompanying text.

185.

See supra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.

186. See supra notes 94-125 and accompanying text.
187. Alan J. Meese, Market Failureand Non-Standard Contracting:How the
Ghost of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
21, 55-56 (2005).
188.

See Petition, supra note 7, at 17.
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a result, they say, millions of American workers sell their labor in
concentrated markets. 189
Even if most American employees labored in concentrated
markets, and even if all employee noncompete agreements arose in
such markets, this would not justify even a rebuttable presumption
that these agreements are the result of economic coercion. For, as
explained later in this Article, even firms with monopoly or
monopsony power sometimes induce employees or customers to agree
to particular contractual provisions voluntarily. 190 Indeed, absent
price regulation, monopolists and monopsonists possess the same
incentives as smaller firms to adopt practices, including contractual
terms, that confer benefits on one party that exceed the costs imposed
on the other. 191 Such firms will instead use their market power to set
profit-maximizing prices or wages. 192
In any event, review of the research cited by Abolitionists reveals
that most employees work in unconcentrated markets. Research
cited by the Petition does conclude that most labor markets are highly
concentrated. 193 However, both the paper cited by the Petition and a
more recent version reveal that those labor markets that are highly
concentrated (HHI above 2500) or even moderately concentrated
(HHI between 1500 and 2500) are small on average and employ only
a modest fraction of American workers. 194
In particular, the authors describe the results of their
investigation as follows:
[W]e find that 20 percent of workers work in highly
concentrated labor markets .. . and a further 8 percent work in
189.

Id. ("Because of this concentration among employers, millions of

American workers have only one or a few employment options.").

190. See infra notes 298-99 and accompanying text.
191. See Meese, Market Power and Contract Formation, supra note 174, at
1353-57. For instance, absent price regulation and information asymmetries, a
profit-maximizing monopolist will voluntarily assume the risk of loss whenever
its cost of avoiding the loss is lower than the loss itself and lower than the
consumer's cost of avoiding the loss. See id. at 1353. Under these conditions,
contractual terms and the resulting allocation of risk will be unrelated to the
relative bargaining power of the parties. See id.

192. Id.
193. See Petition, supra note 7, at 17 (citing Jose A. Azar et al., Concentration
in U.S. Labor Markets: Evidence from Online Vacancy Data 2 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ.
Rsch.,
Working
Paper
No.
24395,
2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3133344.
194. Josh A. Azar et al., Concentrationin U.S. Labor Markets: Evidence from
Online Vacancy Data 14-15 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
et
al.,
Working
Paper]
2019),
[hereinafter
Anzar
24395,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3133344; Jos6 A. Azar et
al., Concentration in U.S. Labor Markets: Evidence from Online Vacancy Data,
LABOuR EcoN., October 2020, at 101,886.
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moderately concentrated markets. Concentration is lower in
large commuting zones, which explains why weighting by
95
employment lowers the prevalence of high concentration.1

While the study concludes that millions of Americans sell their
labor in highly concentrated or moderately concentrated markets, it
also concludes that most do not. 196 Instead, nearly three-quarters of
employees work in labor markets that are unconcentrated, that is,
It appears that most American
have an HHI below 1500.197
that would be considered
markets
in
labor
employees sell their
98
competitive in other contexts.1
These data do not establish that a significant proportion of
employee noncompete agreements arise in competitive markets. It is
theoretically possible that noncompete agreements only arise in
concentrated labor markets, perhaps implying that employers use
bargaining power to impose them. However, any rule premised upon
such an assumption must find some empirical support in the
administrative record. The Petition itself offers no such evidence.
Indeed, a study by an organizational signatory of the Petition
finds that 49.4 percent of responding firms enter into such
agreements with some employees and that "between 27.8% and 46.5%
of private-sector workers are subject to noncompetes." 199 Assuming
the actual percentage subject to noncompetes is 37 percent (the

195.
196.

Jos6 Azar et al., Working Paper, at 2.
Id.

197. See id.; JOSH BIVENS ET AL., EcON. POL'Y INST., IT'S NOT JUST MONOPOLY
AND MONOPSONY: HOW MARKET POWER HAS AFFECTED AMERICAN WAGES 8 (2018)
(characterizing prior version of the paper cited in the previous footnote as finding
that "highly and moderately concentrated labor markets account for only 23
percent of total employment, with 17 percent of employment in 'high' and 6

percent in 'moderately concentrated' labor markets"); id. at 2 (concluding that
rural Americans are far more likely to face concentrated labor markets).

198.

One scholar contends that Professors Azar, Marinescu, Steinbaum, and

Taska define labor markets too narrowly and thus overstate the number of

concentrated markets. See Richard A. Epstein, Antitrust Overreach in Labor
Markets: A Response to Eric Posner, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY, 407, 424-26 (2022).
199. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN & HEIDI SHIERHOLZ, EcON. POL'Y INST.,
NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS: UBIQUITOUS, HARMFUL TO WAGES AND TO
COMPETITION, AND PART OF A GROWING TREND OF EMPLOYERS REQUIRING WORKERS
TO SIGN AWAY THEIR RIGHTS 10 (2019). Another study finds that 38 percent of
employees have been subject to such agreements sometime in their career, but
only 18 percent were subject to such agreements at the time of the survey. Starr
The former report surveyed business
et al., supra note 183, at 60.
establishments, while the latter surveyed employees. COLVIN & SHIERHOLZ,
supra, at 4; Starr et al., supra note 183, at 55-58. The authors of the former
report speculate that some employees may not know that they are subject to such
agreements and that such agreements are becoming more prevalent. See COLVIN
& SHIERHOLZ, supra, at 2-3.
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midpoint between 28 and 46) at a minimum, almost one-quarter of
such agreements arise in unconcentrated markets.200
Abolitionists and others hostile to noncompete agreements often
highlight as paradigm cases agreements apparently arising in
competitive markets. For instance, several highlight the Jimmy
John's agreement discussed above. 201 The Petition offers no evidence
that Jimmy John's franchisees possess market power in all or most of
the labor markets where they operate. At least some such markets
are highly competitive, with franchisees facing significant labor
market competition from numerous other fast-food franchisees and
other potential employers. 202

200. This lower bound calculation assumes that every employee working in a
highly or moderately concentrated labor market-28 percent of the workforceEven adopting this unrealistic
is subject to a noncompete agreement.
assumption, the remaining workers subject to such agreements would constitute
nine percent of the workforce (37 percent minus 28 percent) and thus 24.3 percent
(9 percent divided by 37 percent) of the employees subject to such agreements.
If, however, we assume that half the employees working in concentrated labor
markets are subject to noncompete agreements, 62 percent (23 percent divided
by 37 percent) of such employees work in unconcentrated labor markets. See
COLVIN & SHIERHOLZ, supra note 199, at 10.
201. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (describing invocation of

this agreement by Abolitionists and others).
202. This author's hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia, in James City
County, Virginia, provides one example where Jimmy John's operates in a highly
competitive labor market. James City County has a population of about 80,000

individuals and one Jimmy John's, which recently closed.

James City County,

Virginia,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/jamescitycountyvirginia/PST04522

1 (last visited Aug. 2, 2022). Within a four-mile drive of this Jimmy John's, there
are the following fast-food restaurants: McDonalds, Burger King, Chick-fil-A,
Taco Bell, Subway, Mooyah's, Five Guys, Jersey Mike's, Chipotle, Moe's, Cook
Out, Qdoba, Dunkin', and Arby's. This list does not include various "sit down"
restaurants, both national and local, and other businesses competing for the labor
of potential employees. No franchisee possesses power in this labor market. See
NPR, 356 U.S. at 6-7 (explaining that one of a dozen grocery stores in a small
town lacks the power to coercively

impose a tying contract).

To be sure,

Williamsburg is partly a "touristtown." But one would also find similar levels of
competition in, say, neighboring Newport News, Virginia. Moreover, there are
certainly other regions of the country where the market for fast-food labor is even
more competitive, e.g., cities such as Houston with numerous national franchise

outlets, viz., McDonalds, Burger King, Taco Bell, and Wendy's, competing with
regional chains such as Whataburger and Taco Cabana. There are fifty-seven
Whataburger locations in Houston, twenty-five Taco Cabanas, and twenty-five
Jimmy John's. See All Whataburger Locations in Houston, Texas, WHATABURGER,
https://locations.whataburger.com/tx/houston.html (last visited June 26, 2022);

Find a TC Location, TACO CABANA, https://www.tacocabana.com/find-a-tclocation/ (last visited June 26, 2022); Jimmy John's Locations in Houston, Texas,
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Jimmy John's is not the only proponent of such noncompete
agreements operating in a competitive labor market. 203 The Petition
also invokes agreements obtained by one payday lender with thirtythree locations throughout Illinois. 204 The agreement prevented some
former employees from working at "any payday advance services;
check-cashing services; pawn or title pawn services; secured or
unsecured credit lending services; secured or unsecured installment
lending services; or essentially any other consumer lending service or
money transmission service." 205 Assuming that the relevant market

JIMMY JOHN'S, https://locations.jimmyjohns.com/tx/houston/

(last visit June 26,

2022).
203. For instance, one Seattle firm that owns and operates eight coffee shops
has entered into such agreements with its employees.
See Paul Constant,
Noncompetes and No-Poach Agreements Have Destroyed Opportunitiesfor Tens
of Millions of American Workers. Here's How One State Attorney General Fought

Back, INSIDER (May 22, 2021, 10:19 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/howThere are, of
noncompete-agreements-hurt-minimum-wage-workers-2021-5.
course, numerous other coffee chains in Seattle as well as various nonchain

stores.

See, e.g., Mindy Halleck, 25-Best Coffee Shops, Seattle, Washington,

https://www.gpsmycity.com/directory/25-best-coffee-shopsGPSMYCITY,
1041.html (last visited June 26, 2022). Moreover, the Attorneys General of
Illinois and New York recently challenged employee noncompete agreements

obtained by WeWork, which once had eight locations in Chicago. See Press
Release, Lisa Madigan, Illinois Attorney General, Attorney General Madigan
Reaches Settlement with National Payday Lender for Imposing Unlawful NonCompete Agreements (Jan. 7, 2019) [hereinafter Press Release, Madigan Reaches
Settlement
with
National
Payday
https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2019_01/20190107b.html

Lender],

(describing settlement with WeWork); Press Release, Lisa Madigan, Illinois
Attorney General, Attorney General Madigan Reaches Settlement with WeWork
to
End
Use
of
Overly
Broad
Non-Competes
(Sept.
18,
2018),
https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2018_09/20180918.html
(describing settlement with WeWork); Press Release, Barbara D. Underwood,
New York Attorney General, A.G. Underwood Announces Settlement with

WeWork to End Use of Overly Broad Non-Competes that Restricted Workers'
Ability to Take New Jobs (Sept. 18, 2018), https://ag.ny.gov/pressrelease/2018/ag-underwood- announces-settlement-wework-end-use-overlybroad-non-competes. The agreements governed, inter alia, custodians, baristas,
cleaners, executive assistants, and mail associates. Id. The announcements of
the challenges did not assert that WeWork possessed bargaining power in any
Chicago labor market, nor does it seem remotely likely that the firm possessed
such power.
204. Petition, supra note 7, at 8; Press Release, Madigan Reaches Settlement
with National Payday Lender, supra note 203 (mentioning the thirty-three

locations throughout Illinois).
205. Press Release, Madigan Reaches Settlement with National Payday
Lender, supra note 203 (describing settlement with Check Into Cash of Illinois).
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includes the various services the agreement invokes (if not more), 206
the market would include far more than just payday lenders. Indeed,
the Petition invokes the conclusion of the Illinois Attorney General
that numerous employers could fall within this definition, including
"retail stores or auto dealerships that extend credit on an incidental
basis or entities like Western Union or the U.S. postal service that
transmit money." 207 No single payday lender could possess power in
such a state-wide labor market.
This evidence may seem anecdotal. However, one doubts that
Abolitionists and others would highlight these exemplars if they were
unrepresentative. In any event, other evidence casts additional doubt
on the claim that all or nearly all such agreements arise in
concentrated markets. In particular, scholars have estimated that 80
percent of chief executive officers ("CEOs") at Standard & Poor's
("S&P") 1500 firms have entered such agreements. 208 Presumably,
the market for such labor is national in scope. Moreover, the
continued and well-documented growth in CEO salaries undermines
any claim that such employees are the victims of unequal bargaining
power. 2 09 Most employees work in unconcentrated labor markets.
Because employee noncompete agreements sometimes arise in such
competitive labor markets, those who claim that employers generally
employ bargaining power to impose them presumably bear the

206. Cf. FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 435 n.18 (1990)
("[T]he fact of agreement defines the market." (citation omitted)).
207. Petition, supra note 7, at 8 (quoting Press Release, Madigan Reaches
Settlement with National Payday Lender, supra note 203). If anything, the
Petition understates the breadth of firms governed by the restraint. See Press

Release, Madigan Reaches Settlement with National Payday Lender, supra note
203 ("Check Into Cash's unlawful non-compete agreement restricted employees
from working for any other business that provides consumer lending services or
products for one year after they left the company. These services and products
include any payday advance services; check-cashing services; pawn or title pawn
services; secured or unsecured credit lending services; secured or unsecured
installment lending services; or essentially any other consumer lending service

or money transmission service. Madigan's October 2017 lawsuit against Check
Into Cash alleged that a wide variety of businesses could fall within this broad
definition, including retail stores or auto dealerships that extend credit on an

incidental basis or entities like Western Union or the U.S. postal service that
transmit money.").

208.

See Norman D. Bishara et al., An Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition

Clauses and Other Restrictive Postemployment Contracts, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3

(2015) (finding that 80 percent of the CEOs of a random sample of 500 such firms
were subject to noncompete agreements).

209. A study published by one signatory of the Petition concluded that CEO
pay has risen more than thirteen-fold since 1978. See LAWRENCE MISHEL & JORI
KANDRA, EcON. POL'Y INST., CEO PAY HAS SKYROCKETED 1,322% SINCE 1978:
CEOs WERE PAID 351 TIMES AS MUCH AS A TYPICAL WORKER IN 2010 2 (2021).
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burden of establishing that these examples are the exception and not
the norm.2 10

Abolitionists invoke two other purported sources of employer
power in labor markets. First, many (maybe most) Americans have
few assets and thus have no choice but to supply their labor to
employers if they wish to subsist.2 11 As a result, it is said, employees
must accept whatever terms employers offer, including noncompete
agreements. 212 Second, very few Americans belong to unions, and
thus most cannot rely upon collective bargaining to counteract
employer bargaining power. 2 13
Neither of these attributes suggests that all or most noncompete
agreements that arise in otherwise competitive markets will produce
more harm than benefits and thus depart from results expected in a
No doubt some Americans work
well-functioning market. 214
"paycheck to paycheck" and would have no household income, aside
from public assistance, without working for wages. However, such
workers are far less likely than the more affluent to enter such
agreements. 2 15 In any event, we may stipulate that those who must
work to subsist feel like they have no choice but to accept a
noncompete agreement and/or whatever wages an employer offers.
But this does not mean that the market's equilibrium with respect to
wages or other terms will be suboptimal. If the preferences of
subsistence employees determined wages, for instance, we would
210. Theoretically, all firms in a competitive labor market could adopt
identical noncompete provisions, such that those wishing to work in that industry
must assent to such restriction. Scholars once saw the market-wide adoption of
contractual terms as reflecting "strong bargaining power" that disadvantaged
purchasers. See Kessler, supra note 159, at 632. However, the uniform adoption
of a practice by numerous competing firms is equally consistent with a conclusion
that the practice is the efficient result of a well-functioning market. For instance,
the fact that consumer product warranties include exclusions for commercial use
suggests that consumers are not willing to pay for enhanced protection, unrelated
to any bargaining power. See George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product

Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1331-33 (1981) (describing economic rationale of
exclusions for commercial use found in such warranties); id. at 1313
("[D]isclaimers and exclusions can be said to be demanded by consumers because
of the relative cheapness of consumer allocative investments .... "). In any event,
the Petition cites no competitive market, and this author knows of none, where
all employers have adopted such terms.

211.
212.
213.

See Petition, supra note 7, at 2.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 22.

214. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text (explaining that parties
will only adopt noncompetes in a well-functioning market if such contracts
generate benefits that exceed the costs such agreements impose on employees).
215. See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 30, at 1039-40 ("37 percent of

employees earning over $100,000 a year are subject to noncompetes [while] this
is only true of 14 percent of employees earning up to $40,000.").
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expect all employees to earn the lowest wage allowed by law.
The proportion of
However, data contradict this prediction.
employees that earn the minimum wage has fallen steadily, from 13.4
percent in 1979 to 1.5 percent in 2020.216 At the same time, a far more
significant portion of the workforce than 1.5 percent lacks any
significant assets or nonlabor source of income. 217 Why do labor
markets with substantial proportions of subsistence employees
nonetheless produce wages well above the level predicted by the
Abolitionist account?
The short answer is that individuals who are not subsistence
employees often work in these same markets. Indeed, most low-wage
employees occupy households in the three highest income quintiles,
and one-third of households that include a low-income employee earn
over $75,000 per year, nearly quintuple the minimum wage for one
Households that include such low-income workers
earner.2 18
necessarily have sources of income significantly larger than the
income of such workers, thereby raising the prospect that these lowincome workers need not accept whatever terms that an employer
Put another way, potential employees from such
might offer.
households presumably constitute the "marginal" employees in the
labor market they inhabit and are thus more willing to exit in
response to unfavorable terms of employment. The presence of these
employees in the relevant market increases the elasticity of labor
supply, protecting other participants whose supply is inelastic. 2 19
Unless employers engage in contract term discrimination, the
preferences of these "marginal" employees, and not those of
216.

Characteristics of Minimum Wage Workers, 2020, U.S. BUREAU LAB.

(Feb.
STAT.
wage/2020/home.htm

https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/minimum2021),
("The percentage of hourly paid workers earning the

prevailing federal minimum wage or less declined from 1.9 percent in 2019 to 1.5
percent in 2020. This remains well below the percentage of 13.4 recorded in 1979,
when data were first collected on a regular basis."). Of course, some states impose
minimum wages higher than the federal minimum. However, this is not a new
development.

217.

Petition, supra note 7, 14-15.

218.

See Johnathan Meer, Who Benefits from a Minimum Wage?, ECONOFACT

2018),

https://econofact.org/who-benefits-from-a-higher-minimum-

(Nov.

27,

wage.

A single minimum wage employee with a forty-hour workweek earns

$15,080 annually. What Are the Annual Earnings for a Full-Time Minimum
Wage Worker?: Minimum Wage Basic Calculations and its Impact on Poverty,
CTR.
FOR POVERTY & INEQ. RScH., U.C. DAvIS
(Jan.
12,
2018),
https://poverty.ucdavis.edu/faq/what-are-annual-earnings-full-time-minimum-

wage-worker.
219. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis
of Imperfect Information:A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630,
638-39 (1979) (demonstrating that search and comparison of prices by some
consumers can ensure competitive prices for all); id. at 659-61 (describing similar
result for contract terms).
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subsistence employees, will determine the equilibrium terms in the
labor market. 220 Moreover, background rules of contract law increase
the cost of pursuing a term discrimination strategy. 221 Employers
that engage in such discrimination will be unable to claim that the
resulting agreements are "standard" and thus will not be able to
enforce them absent an individualized showing that the employee
subjectively assented to the clause. 222
What, though, about unions? Certainly, such labor cartels and
the resulting exercise of monopoly power can offset the power of
monopsonistic firms. 223 However, the data recounted above suggest
that there is usually no such power to offset in the first place. 224 Thus,
in most employment relationships, the introduction of collective
bargaining over conditions of employment will produce the
straightforward consequences of a cartel, namely, labor supply that
is lower and wages that are higher than would prevail in a
competitive market. 225 Nor is there any reason to expect that a union
would exercise such power to influence the content of noncompete
agreements instead of wages. 226
Of course, the presence of substantial competition in the relevant
labor market does not guarantee that each aspect of resulting
bargains will be optimal.
For instance, imperfect information,
however caused, could allow employers to obtain putative agreement
to such provisions even if they reduce the parties' joint welfare.
Imagine, for instance, if an employer included such clauses in form
contracts that employees do not read. Imagine further that such an
agreement would nonetheless be binding and enforceable under state

220.

See id. at 662-63 (explaining how price discrimination can prevent

searching consumers from protecting nonsearchers from noncompetitive prices
and how contract term discrimination can allow firms to impose inefficient terms

on unsophisticated consumers); Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the
Quasi-InvisibleHand, 17 J.L. & ECON. 461, 485 (1974).
221. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 27-28 (1988)
(explaining how the state can reduce transaction costs and enhance the allocation
of resources "by altering the requirements for making a legally binding contract").
222. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 211(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981)
(explaining that absent subjective assent, a court will enforce an agreement as
"standard" if the party to be bound understood that "like writings are regularly

used to embody terms of agreements

of the

same type");

id. cmt.

b

trust to the good faith of the party using the form and to the tacit
("Customers ...
representation that like terms are being accepted regularly by others similarly
situated.").
223. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF
COUNTERVAILING POWER 132-34 (1952) (describing how unions' monopoly power
over labor services can offset employers' monopsonistic power).

224.

See Petition, supra note 7, at 22.

225.

See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 268-69 (3d ed. 1966).

226.

See Petition, supra note 7, at 18-21.
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law and not contrary to the Sherman Act. 227 In these circumstances,
the presence of such clauses would not alter employees' willingness to
supply their labor at the offered wage, with the result that employers
would not internalize the cost that such agreements impose upon
employees. 228 Employers could thus obtain (nominal but enforceable)
agreement to such one-sided provisions. The resulting equilibrium
would reflect too many such agreements and/or agreements with
unduly onerous terms.
Certainly, some employee noncompete agreements arise in
Moreover, such
markets beset by information shortcomings.
parties'
behavior. Some
shortcomings are not always exogenous to
employers do not reveal noncompete agreements until after the
employee accepts the employment offer. 229
However, preexisting aspects of the institutional framework may
obviate the formation of harmful agreements. 2 30 For instance, some
31
states require preemployment disclosure of such agreements. 2
These states decline to enforce noncompete agreements that are
imposed after employees accept employment, unless the employer
provides adequate additional consideration. 232 Moreover, general
rules governing the enforcement of form contracts render
unenforceable unknown terms outside the reasonable expectations of
the employee. 233
227. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTs. § 70 (AM. L. INST. 1932) (enforcing
terms regardless of subjective awareness or whether proponent has reason to
believe that counterparty would object).

228.

See Posner, supra note 62, at 190 ("It is possible that noncompetes

suppress wages because workers who sign [noncompetes] do not demand a wage
premium-because of ignorance .... ").

229. See Evan Starr et al., supra note 183, at 69 (finding that 30 percent of
employees learned of noncompete clauses after accepting employment offers).
230. Cf. COASE, supra note 221, at 27 28 (explaining how background rules
making it more difficult to enter certain contracts may eliminate market
failures). Indeed, competition between states to produce such institutional

frameworks may hasten the creation of efficient background rules.

See Meese,

FranchisorOpportunism, supra note 61, at 80 81. Ironically, the abolition of all
noncompete agreements would prevent competitive federalism from generating

efficient background rules that discourage the enforcement of inefficient
agreements. See id. at 86-87.
231. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49.62.020(1)(a)(i) (2019) (requiring
preacceptance written disclosure of employee noncompete agreements); MASS.

GEN. LAws ch. 149, § 24L(b) (2021) (same).
232. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49.62.020(1)(a)(ii) (2019) (requiring
additional consideration if employer adopts noncompete clause "after the
commencement of employment"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24L(b)(ii) (2021)
(same).
233. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 211(3) (AM. L. INST. 1979)
(declining to enforce unknown standard terms where proponent has "reason to

believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that
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In any event, the presence of some market failures does not
Most
justify banning all employee noncompete agreements.
the
accepts
the
employee
before
agreements
such
employers disclose
234
all
Banning
asymmetry.
information
reducing
offer,
employment
unnecessarily
could
is
suboptimal
a
fraction
such agreements because
destroy wealth, making many employers and employees worse off.
VI. DEVELOPMENTS IN ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE UNDERMINE ABOLITIONIST CLAIMS THAT SUCH
AGREEMENTS NEVER PRODUCE COGNIZABLE BENEFITS

Abolitionists do not rely solely on the invocation of a flawed
bargaining process. They also assert that, whatever the process,
235
This claim
"non-competes do not have a credible justification."
during the
territories
exclusive
say,
of,
critiques
echoes analogous
inhospitality era. 2 36 Because such agreements supposedly produced
no cognizable benefits but restrained rivalry, the natural inference
was that manufacturers imposed them against dealers' wills and that
237
such contracts reflected a harmful exercise of market power.
By analogy, employee noncompete agreements reduce employee
If such
autonomy and limit competition for employee labor.
is
implication
natural
the
benefits,
cognizable
no
produce
agreements
2 38
that they enhance employers' profits on some nonefficiency basis.
Indeed, if such agreements really cannot produce cognizable benefits,
the Sherman Act should condemn them as unlawful per se because
they have a "pernicious effect on competition and lack . .. redeeming
virtue[s] .... "239 There would thus be no reason to invoke Section 5
the writing contained the particular term . . .. "). Abolitionists emphasize that
employers sometimes threaten to enforce unenforceable provisions, thereby
deterring employees from accepting outside offers. See Petition, supranote 7, at

28-29.

Perhaps the Commission could ban such conduct as an unfair trade

practice, thereby bolstering state law determinations that particular agreements
Another scholar recommends that states require robust
are unenforceable.
disclosure regarding whether and when such agreements are enforceable. See

Rachel Arnow-Richman, The New Enforcement Regime: Revisiting the Law of
Employee Competition (and the Scholarship of Professor Charles Sullivan) with

2020 Vision, 50 SETON HALL L. REv. 1223, 1254-55 (2020); see also N. Brock
Enger, Offers You Can't Refuse: Post-HireNoncompete Agreement Insertions and

Procedural UnconscionabilityDoctrine, 2020 Wis. L. REv. 769, 771 (contending
that an employer's failure to disclose such an agreement until after the employee
has accepted the employment offer should establish procedural unconscionability
and militate against enforcement).
234. See Starr et al., supranote 183, at 69.
235. Petition, supra note 7, at 3.

236.
237.
238.
239.

See
See
See
See

Meese, supra note 143, at 125-31.
id. at 128-31.
id. at 122-23.
NPR, 356 U.S. at 5.
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of the FTC Act or the "inherently suspect" category of restraints
recognized by Section 1 jurisprudence. Moreover, the bargaining
process would be beside the point. After all, cartel agreements are
entirely voluntary, yet courts condemn such agreements as unlawful
per se because they cannot produce cognizable benefits. 240
As explained below, both developments in economic science and
empirical evidence strongly suggest that a significant proportion of
noncompete agreements in fact produce cognizable benefits. 241 In
particular, many employee noncompete agreements apparently
overcome a market failure that would otherwise occur by ensuring
that employers can capture the benefits of investing in the general
human capital of their employees. 2 42 Such investments increase
employee productivity and thus boost interbrand competition. 24 3
Courts have repeatedly and properly treated analogous effects as
cognizable benefits for the purpose of assessing agreements under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act. 244 In both
contexts, the prospect that restraints may produce such benefits
obviates summary condemnation in favor of assessment under the
fact-intensive Rule of Reason.
A.
The Presenceof Employee Noncompete Agreements in
Competitive Markets Suggests That Some Such ContractsProduce
Significant Benefits
As Justice Brandeis once explained, proper assessment of a
practice may turn on the market positions of the parties. 245
Abolitionists have not adduced any evidence that all or most
noncompete agreements arise in concentrated labor markets. Some
agreements that they have invoked, like the Jimmy John's
agreement, apparently arise in competitive markets. 246

Moreover,

employers disclose most such agreements before the employee accepts
employment. 247 Like tying agreements that arose in competitive

240. See John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Reciprocal Altruism as a Felony: Antitrust
and the Prisoner'sDilemma, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1906, 1918-20 (1988) (explaining
how participation in a cartel is generally voluntary).

241. See discussion infra Sections VI.B, VI.C., and VI.D.
242. See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 30, at 969 71.
243. See Starr et al., supra note 183, at 54.
244. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877, 885-92 (2007).
245. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 438 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[A]
method of competition fair among equals may be very unfair if applied where

there is inequality of resources."), overruled by FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S.
316 (1966).
246. See Posner, supra note 62, at 165.
247. See Starr et al., supra note 183, at 69. Abolitionists have adduced no
evidence that employers only disclose such agreements in concentrated markets.
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markets and thus challenged price theory's account of the formation
of such agreements, noncompete agreements that are disclosed in
advance and arise in competitive markets challenge the Abolitionist
account. 24 8 Those employee noncompete agreements that do arise in
competitive markets are less likely to produce the sort of harm that
Abolitionists attribute to them because potential employees can avoid
such agreements by accepting employment from other firms.
If employee noncompete agreements cannot produce competitive
harm, the parties who have invested resources into negotiating and
enforcing them presumably believed they would create some
benefits. 249 Moreover, if such agreements sought by employers
without power in the labor market can create benefits, then
agreements entered into by firms with market power can create such
benefits as well. Even monopolists can enter into efficient contracts
that replicate those that would arise in a competitive market. 25 0 As
shown in Subparts B, C, and D below, theory and evidence confirm
the inference that employee noncompete agreements often produce
significant net benefits that cannot be achieved in some other way. 2 5 1
Contrary claims by Abolitionists echo the inhospitality era's
discredited critiques of other nonstandard contracts.
B. Developments in Economic Science Suggest That Many Such
Agreements Produce Significant Cognizable Benefits
The Abolitionist claim that such agreements produce no
cognizable benefits would have made perfect sense in, say, 1962,
when nearly all economists and others believed that nonstandard
agreements were unambiguously anticompetitive. 25 2 For instance,
scholars and expert enforcement agencies contended that atomistic
competition between firms would produce the right amount and type
In the
of advertising, promotion, and other dealer efforts. 25 3
alternative, they contended that parties could achieve any such

It thus seems safe to assume that employee noncompete agreements that arise
in competitive markets are often disclosed in advance.
248. See Meese, supra note 143, at 127, 137.

249. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 2123 (1979) (finding that adoption of practice by small performing rights societies
militated against per se condemnation); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van
Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("If it is clear that [defendants] by
eliminating competition among themselves are not attempting to restrict
industry output, then their agreement must be designed to make the conduct of
their business more effective.").
250. See, e.g., Meese, Market Power and Contract Formation,supra note 174,

at 1353 54.
251. See discussion infra Sections VI.B, VI.C, and VI.D.
252. See Williamson, Credible Commitments, supranote 130, at 535.
253.

See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
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benefits via the less restrictive means of areas of primary
responsibility. 254
However, Section 1's Rule of Reason compels courts and agencies
to adjust doctrine in light of changed economic understandings about
the impacts of particular restraints. 2 55 Moreover, the Commission's
status as an expert enforcement agency requires it to apply such
expertise when assessing the probable impact of restraints alleged to
be unfair methods of competition. 256 Even if a solid line of precedent
declared employee noncompete agreements unlawful per se, the
Commission would be free to reassess such treatment, subject, of
course, to judicial review. In fact, precedent cuts entirely the other
257
way, declining to condemn such agreements outright.
The scientific revolution known as TCE rejected neoclassical
price theory's assessment of nonstandard contracts and offered an
25 8
alternative account of the origin and impact of such agreements.
In particular, Professor Oliver Williamson and other practitioners of
TCE concluded that such agreements could counteract market
failures that would otherwise result from relying on atomistic
markets to conduct economic activity. 2 5 9
The distribution of a manufactured product provided the
paradigmatic economic problem addressed by TCE. Assume that a
manufacturer declines to distribute its own products but instead
relies upon market transactions-sales to independent dealers-to do
so. The success of such a strategy would depend largely upon the
254.
255.

See Turner, supra note 151, at 699.
See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988)

("The Sherman Act adopted the term 'restraint of trade' along with its dynamic
potential. It invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content

that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890."); Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55 (1911) (describing with approval
evolution of common law and statutory regulation of trade restraints in light of
"more accurate economic conceptions and the changes in conditions of society");

see also California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (opining that
category of restraint could become inherently suspect under Section 1 and Section

5 "if rule-of-reason analyses in case after case reach identical conclusions").
256. See, e.g., Polygram Holdings, Inc., 136 F.T.C. 310, 353-58, 355 n.52
(2003) (reviewing modern economic theory and nineteen empirical studies to
inform assessment of whether restraint was "inherently suspect" and thus
presumptively a method of unfair competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act).

257. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
258. See Meese, supra note 187, at 22.
259. See Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions:
Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 953,
991-92 (1979); see also Brief for Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n as Amicus
Curiae at 7-8, Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (No. 7615) (arguing "a growing body of modern economic thinking about vertical
relationships" counsels reconsideration of antitrust's hostility to nonstandard

contracts). It should be noted that Donald Turner coauthored this brief.
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Unlike
extent and quality of the dealer's promotional efforts.
local
possess
manufacturers, independent dealers potentially
260
after
Still,
knowledge about optimal promotional strategies.
purchasing the manufacturer's product, dealers may lack adequate
incentives to generate and utilize such knowledge. After all, a dealer
that convinces consumers to purchase the product has no guarantee
that the consumer will purchase from it instead of purchasing from
other dealers. Indeed, dealers that decline to make promotional
investments will enjoy lower costs and thus a competitive advantage
compared to firms that do. Rational dealers considering whether to
make such investments will predictably decline to do so, knowing that
they may not capture the benefits, i.e., increased sales of the
manufacturer's product. 26 1
In short, a manufacturer's reliance on market transactionsindependent dealers-to distribute its product entails a cost, namely,
the expectation that dealers will underinvest in promotion and
advertising, reducing demand for the product below what it might
otherwise be. Exclusive territories can reduce or eliminate this cost
by ensuring that dealers capture the benefits of such investments.
Armed with this assurance, dealers can employ their local knowledge
and pursue optimal promotional strategies. 26 2 The result is an
improved allocation of resources in the form of investments in
promotion and advertising that otherwise would not occur and
increased consumer welfare.263
To be sure, such agreements reduce rivalry between dealers and
thus, when enforced against a given dealer, seemingly reduce that
individual dealer's expected profits. Framed in this way, exclusive
territories seem quite literally "anticompetitive" and "harmful to
260. See Alan J. Meese, Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints, 89
CoRNELL L. REV. 553, 559-60 (2004); see also Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason
and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 815,
818 n.139 (1965); Lester G. Telser, Why Should ManufacturersWant FairTrade?,
3 J.L. & EcoN. 86, 97 (1960).
A fully integrated firm
261. See Meese, supra note 260, at 590-98.
would capture the benefits of such investments, as consumers would necessarily
purchase the firm's products from company-owned dealers. See id. at 590.
However, manufacturers presumably abjure complete integration because they

wish to harness the superior effort by independent dealers, who, unlike
employees of fully integrated manufacturers, will fully internalize the increased
revenues resulting from promotional efforts. See id. at 596.

262.
263.

See Williamson, supra note 259, at 958 & n.26.
See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 56 n.25 (rejecting the claim that "a large part

of the promotional efforts resulting from vertical restrictions will not convey

socially desirable information"); Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and
Consumer Welfare, 77 YALE L.J. 950, 955-56 (1968) (explaining why advertising
and promotion induced by minimum resale price maintenance constitute socially
valuable output).
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dealers." Moreover, viewed at this moment in time, it is difficult to
see why a dealer would have entered into this agreement voluntarily,
even if the agreement produces social benefits. However, many such
agreements arose in competitive markets, thereby calling into
question assertions that such agreements were coercive and injured
consumers or dealers. 264
As Professor Williamson explained, proper assessment of
exclusive territories and other nonstandard agreements requires
courts and agencies to consider them "in their entirety" instead of
simply considering the isolated term that restricts one party's
Such holistic
autonomy at a particular moment in time. 265
consideration, he said, often reveals that the restrained party has
received compensation that induced initial acceptance of a wealthcreating, yet restrictive, term. 26 6 Parties who want to retain such
compensation but ignore the restriction are "trying to have their cake
and eat it too . ... "267 Indeed, Professor Williamson concluded
...
that courts and enforcement agencies should adopt a "[p]resumption
[e] nhance
[n]ormally
[r]estrictions
[m]arket
[v] ertical
that
[e]fficiency." 268
TCE's account of such agreements also undermined the
assumption that nonstandard contracts necessarily result from
264. See, e.g., Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 38 (reporting that manufacturer possessed
a "1% to 2%" market share when it obtained dealer agreement to location

clauses).
265. WILLIAMSON, supra note 127, at 35 (emphasis in original).
266. Id. at 371.
Speaking about antitrust treatment of distribution
267. See id. at 35.
restraints, Professor Williamson opined as follows:
It is easy to conclude, upon examining a contract at a point in time, that
one of the parties to the exchange is disadvantaged by the restraint-

in the sense that the restrained party would behave differently if the
restraint were removed. Thus, franchisees would frequently exercise
the option to buy supplies (product; replacement parts) from
unauthorized suppliers if permitted. That supposedly demonstrates
that manufacturer insistence that purchases be made only from
authorized suppliers is one-sided and anticompetitive. Such a myopic
conception fails to recognize that the terms under which the original
It is
franchise was struck reflect the associated restraints.
understandably attractive to have your cake (low price) and eat it too
(no restrictions). But both the theory and the practice of contract
preclude that.

Id. at 371.
268. Williamson, supra note 259, at 958; id. at 960 ("The principal reason for
maintaining an efficiency presumption is that this presumption accords with
reality.... [A]nticompetitive effects can appear only if rather special structural
conditions exist."). See also WILLIAMSON, supra note 127, at 28 ("[TCE] maintains
the rebuttable presumption that nonstandard forms of contracting have
efficiency purposes.").

2022]

EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETEAGREEMENTS

683

defects in the bargaining process, such as unequal bargaining power
Instead, TCE offered an alternative
or imperfect information.
explanation for the existence of such agreements, explaining how they
could arise in competitive markets. 269 In his pathbreaking work,
Professor Williamson explained how manufacturers, for instance, can
obtain voluntary agreement to contractual safeguards that protect
270
In
firms from opportunistic behavior by dealers and others.
particular, firms can offer two contractual options at different prices:
(1) sale of the product at a high price, with no contractual safeguard
(an example of classical market contracting); and (2) sale of the
product with such a post-sale contractual safeguard (say, an exclusive
territory) at a lower price. 271 At first glance, such a price differential,
particularly the "threat" to charge a higher price if the dealer does not
agree to the (nonstandard) safeguard, appears to reflect the firm's
exercise of market power. Market power, after all, is the ability to
profitably price above cost, and costs appear to be unrelated to the
contractual alternative offered. 272 However, a necessary implication
of TCE is that costs include more than the technological cost of
production but also include transaction costs. The higher price
offered for sale without any safeguard would reflect the additional
cost the manufacturer would incur by relying upon the marketThus, the price
transacting-to distribute the firm's product.
the
different costs
would
reflect
differential Williamson described
273
The
agreement.
possible
each
under
that the seller would incur
be
no
would
a
safeguard
to
observe
resulting agreement by the dealer
a
consumer
that
a
warranty
more "involuntary" or "coercive" than

269. Cf. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm:Meaning, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 19,
26-27 (1988) ("I was looking for an explanation for the existence of the firm which
did not depend on monopoly. I found it, of course, in transaction costs.").

270. WILLIAMSON, supra note 127, at 32-35; see also Meese, Market Power and
Contract Formation, supra note 174, at 1345-53. Other scholars referred to
certain nonstandard agreements as voluntary, without explaining how parties
See Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost
induced each other to enter them.
Determinants of "Unfair"ContractualArrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 356, 356
(1980) ("This paper considers some transaction costs that might explain the
that have been under legal
voluntary adoption of contractual provisions ...

attack.").
271. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 127, at 32-35.
272. See A.P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of
Monopoly Power, 1 REV. EcON. STUD. 157, 157-58, 168-69 (1934) (defining
market power in this manner).
273. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 127, at 32-35. For instance, under the
alternative with no safeguard, the manufacturer would anticipate suboptimal
promotion by dealers, reduced demand for the manufacturer's product, and lower
profits. The price under this alternative would thus exceed the price of a sale
with a safeguard by an amount equal to the reduced profit.
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might select from several options that reflected the actual cost of
each. 274
Professor Williamson did not address employee noncompete
agreements. However, such agreements share some attributes of the
For instance, such
nonstandard agreements he did address.
agreements accompany an ongoing relationship between trading
partners (employer and employee), a relationship that entails
investments by the parties that will (potentially) produce significant
value within the context of their cooperation. 275 Investments by the
employer in training employees will only redound to the employer's
benefit over time and only if the employee remains with the employer.
Such investments will also be susceptible to free riding by third
parties. Like opportunistic dealers who free ride on promotional
investments by other dealers, rival employers may free ride on the
initial employer's investments. It would thus seem that employee
noncompete agreements are strong candidates for the application of
Professor Williamson's presumption that nonstandard agreements
276
serve economizing purposes.

Long before Professor Williamson articulated his presumption,
William Howard Taft, quoting a previous English decision,
articulated an economic rationale for treating employee noncompete
agreements as "ancillary restraints" and thus presumptively
enforceable:
Contracts for the partial restraint of trade are upheld, not
because they are advantageous to the individual with whom the
contract is made, and a sacrifice pro tanto of the rights of the
community, but because it is for the benefit of the public at large
that they should be enforced. . . . And such is the class of cases
of much more frequent occurrence, and to which this present
case belongs, of a tradesman, manufacturer, or professional
man taking [an employee] or clerk into his service, with a
Nonsubstantive
Alan
Schwartz,
A
Reexamination of
274. See
Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1072 (1977) (explaining that a profitmaximizing monopolist will offer cost-justified warranty terms if consumers are
willing to pay for them); id. at 1071-76 (explaining that monopolist
manufacturers will not employ power to alter content of warranties they offer
consumers).

275.

Cf. Coase, supra note 135, at 396 (referring to "transactions" within

firms).

276.

See Williamson, supra note 259, at 958-60.

To be sure, Professor

Williamson articulated his presumption with respect to vertical restraints. Id.
at 958. Employee noncompete agreements can be characterized as horizontal in

nature. See, e.g., Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 189
(7th Cir. 1985) (opining that ancillary restraints, including employee noncompete
agreements, are horizontal). At any rate, as I have explained elsewhere, TCE

considerations establish that nonstandard horizontal agreements are equally
capable of producing cognizable benefits. Meese, supra note 120, at 878-79.
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contract that he will not carry on the same trade or profession
within certain limits. ... In such a case the public derives an
advantage in the unrestrained choice which such a stipulation
gives to the employer of able assistants, and the security it
affords that the [employer] will not withhold from the [employee]
instructionin the secrets of his trade, and the communication of
his own skill and experience, from the fear of his afterwards
77
having a rival in the same business.2

Taft, of course, was unfamiliar with Williamson's work.
However, numerous scholars who are familiar with the TCE
framework have echoed Taft's conclusion. 27 8 These scholars draw on
the distinction between two forms of human capital: general and
specific. 27 9 The former consists of skills and knowledge that are
useful at any firm in the relevant industry, including a firm an
277. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898)
(emphasis added) (quoting Mallan v. May (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 967 (Ex.)). See
also Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 281 ("[I]t was of importance that business men and
professional men should have every motive to employ the ablest assistants, and
to instruct them thoroughly"). Numerous other courts have articulated a similar

rationale for enforcing such agreements. See, e.g., Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 18889; Hitchcock v. Coker (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 167 (KB) 175 (describing "receiving
instruction in a particular trade" as the valid consideration that supported
enforcement of the agreement).
278. For the formal articulation of this account, see Paul H. Rubin & Peter

Shedd, Human Capitaland Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 95100 (1981); see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in
Other scholars
Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 685 (1980).
previously articulated a similar account, albeit without distinguishing between
general and specific human capital. See, e.g., Blake, supra note 20, at 652 ("The
cost of training represents an investment by the employer in the employee-one
which he hopes to recapture, with appropriate return, from the enhanced
productivity of the employee's future services. However, the employer cannot be
sure that the employee will stay on so that the investment will be rewarded ....

Thus, the employer may feel justified in seeking to make it more difficult for the
employee to leave-particularly to go into competitive employment-by any
effective device at hand. A covenant against postemployment competition may

have the desired effect. Furthermore, a plausible public-policy argument is
available: Unless some enforceable commitment or effective deterrent is possible,
employers will not be justified in making the optimum outlay on employeetraining programs[.]"); see also Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 30, at 969-71
(articulating this account); Starr et al., supra note 183, at 54 (summarizing

additional literature contending that: "[e]nforceable noncompetes solve this
holdup problem by prohibiting departures to competitors, which encourages
employers to make these fragile but important productivity-enhancing

investments."). But see Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training,
and the Limits of Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49, 49-51 (2001)
(recognizing possible application of TCE framework to such contracts but

questioning conclusions reached by scholars who have applied this approach).
279. Rubin & Shedd, supra note 278, at 95-96.
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employee might establish, while the latter consists of skills that are
most useful at the particular firm. 280 Firms can generally capture the
benefits of investments in specific human capital because such
benefits are by hypothesis most useful in connection with the
employer's own production. Therefore, other firms will not be willing
or able to outbid the original employer for the services of the employee
who has received such training. 28 1 However, so long as they operate
in atomistic markets, firms will not be assured of capturing the
benefits of investments in general human capital. 282 As a result,
other firms will rationally bid for the services of these employees,
hoping to acquire their talents. Presumably, firms contemplating
investments in general human capital will understand their rivals'
incentives and the resulting insecurity of investments in general
human capital.
Given these assumptions, scholars contend that employee
noncompete agreements can safeguard employers' investments in
general human capital from opportunistic behavior by preventing
rivals who have not made such investments from luring away trained
employees with the promise of higher salaries. 283 It should be noted
that such opportunistic employers may be able to pay a salary
premium to attract such employees precisely because they have not
invested in employee human capital. Absent some safeguard against
such opportunistic free riding, a market failure will ensue, as reliance
on market-driven training will result in suboptimal investments. 284

280.
281.
282.

See id.
See id. at 95-96.
Id. at 96.

283. See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 30, at 969-71.
284. The Petition characterizes the contention that employee noncompete
agreements can encourage investments in employee training as resting on

"neoclassical economic theory." Petition, supra note 7, at 40. However, like other
transaction cost interpretations of nonstandard contracts, this interpretation
depends upon several departures from neoclassical price theory. For instance,
this account assumes that parties may behave opportunistically by attempting to

exploit investments made by others. Cf. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The
Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political
Economy, J. EcoN. PERSPS., Winter 1993, at 83, 84 (contending price theory rested
upon the assumption that market participants behaved as "Victorian

gentlem[en]" and did not behave opportunistically). See generally Williamson,
supra note 259, at 957-58 (describing important role of opportunism in TCE
reasoning). The account also assumes that property rights are imperfectly
specified, such that firms must take private measures to create the equivalent of

such rights and assure themselves of the ability to capture the benefits of
investment in training. Cf. Meese, supra note 187, at 79-80 (explaining that the
perfect competition model depends upon preexisting fixed and well-specified
property rights).
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Like Taft and previous English decisions, 285 several state courts have
opined that the propensity of a restraint to encourage such
investments in employee training is a legitimate interest that can
2 86
support enforcement of an employee noncompete agreement.
285.

See Mallan v. May (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 967, 972 (Ex.) (stating that

enforcement

of such agreements

will induce

an employer to "instruct[]"

employees "in the secrets of his trade," and "communicate[] .*.. his own skill and
experience" to employees); Hitchcock v. Coker (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 167 (KB) 175
(treating "receiving instruction in a particular trade" as valid consideration
supporting enforcement of employee noncompete agreement).

286.

See, e.g., Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. More, 869 A.2d 884, 897 (N.J. 2005)

(treating "protecting investment in the training of a physician" as a "legitimate
interest[]" of the employer that could support enforcement of employee

noncompete agreement); id. ("[T]he evidence established that JFK made a
substantial investment in Dr. More by giving him the opportunity to accumulate

knowledge and hone his skills as a neurosurgeon."); Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d
84, 91 (Kan. 1996) (describing "special training" as a "legitimate business
interest" that can support enforcement); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Mills, 127

S.E.2d 796, 797-98 (Ga. 1962) (enforcing noncompetition covenant when the
employee "was given courses of training which could be used against the
employer"); id. ("The employee was trained for the kind of work carried on
throughout the area covered by the restriction, and under the contract he was
subject to be sent to all parts of that area."); Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v.

Martucci, 136 A.2d 838, 846 (Pa. 1957) ("An employee may receive specialized
trainingand skills, and learn the carefully guarded methods of doing business
which are the trade secrets of a particular enterprise. To prevent an employee
from utilizing such training and information in competition with his former
employer, for the patronage of the public at large, restrictive covenants are
entered into. They are enforced by the courts as reasonably necessary for the

protection of the employer." (emphases added)); see also Victaulic Co. v. Tieman,
499 F.3d 227, 235 (3d Cir. 2007) (reading Martucci as treating protection of
investments in "specialized training and skills" as legitimate business interest
that will support a properly tailored employee noncompete agreement); Curtis

1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 947-48 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that Delaware
but not Illinois would treat investments in employee's "human capital" as a
"legitimate interest" supportive of a noncompete agreement); Nationwide Mut.

Ins. Co. v. Cornutt, 907 F.2d 1085, 1087-88 (11th Cir. 1990) (summarizing
Alabama law that "[a] protectable interest can also arise from the employer's

investment in its employee, in terms of time, resources and responsibility");
Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 70911 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga Cnty. 1952); Lester, supra note 278, at 57-59 (citing
additional cases but contending that such decisions reflect minority position).
Some states have also expressly recognized this interest by statute. See, e.g.,
COLo. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(2)(c) (2022) (permitting agreement allowing employer
to recover the costs of training employees so long as "training is distinct from

normal, on-the-job training"); FLA. STAT. § 542.335(b) (2022) (stating that
"legitimate business interest" includes "[e]xtraordinary or specialized training").
One widely cited scholarly intervention claimed that courts never recognize the
employer's interest in recapturing training investments as a rationale for

enforcement. See Blake, supra note 20, at 652. The cases cited earlier in this
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Other scholars identified a different market failure that
Firms often must produce
noncompete agreements can solve.
information to enhance product quality (such as a secret recipe) or
facilitate distribution (such as a customer list).287 Disclosure of such
information beyond the firm is detrimental, and the prospect of
disclosure will attenuate the incentives to produce such information.
While trade secret law and nondisclosure agreements may protect
such information, noncompete agreements can bolster this
protection. 288 Courts have repeatedly recognized that protection of
such secrets is a legitimate interest that can justify enforcement of
employee noncompete agreements. 289

Williamson's

presumption

would

predict

that

most

such

agreements serve anti-opportunism purposes, encourage investments

in human capital and information, overcome market failures, and
thus enhance worker productivity and firm output. To be sure,
employers can also behave opportunistically, enforcing agreements
solely for the purpose of depressing wages and/or insulating
themselves from competition. 2 90 However, the existence of other
bodies of law, such as contract law and antitrust law, which already
police and condemn unreasonable agreements, would bolster that
presumption as applied to agreements that remain unscathed by
these other regimes. 291
Recall that Abolitionists contend that free riding usually entails
the beneficial sharing of information and skills that enhance society's
footnote refute this blanket statement. Moreover, TCE bolsters the views of those
courts that have recognized this impact as a cognizable benefit. In any event,

state law generated when assessing the enforcement of private agreements does
not limit the range of cognizable benefits the FTC may recognize when assessing
whether such contracts are "unfair methods of competition" or violate the
Sherman Act. Finally, states that refuse to recognize training as a legitimate
interest have not yet fully internalized the teachings of TCE.

287. See Kitch, supra note 278, at 701-02.
288. See id. at 684-85.
289. See, e.g., Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon, 576 F.3d 1223, 1233-36
(11th Cir. 2009) (Florida law).
290. See Rubin & Shedd, supranote 278, at 99 (recognizing potential employer
opportunism in this context).

291.

See Blake, supra note 20, at 643-46 (describing jurisprudence declining

to enforce agreements that are broader than necessary and/or impose undue
hardship on employees). Indeed, this body of law presumably induces some
employers to draft narrower agreements than they might otherwise. The

infamous Jimmy John's

agreement, for instance, only precluded former

employees from working for rivals who derived 10 percent or more of their
revenues from "submarine, hero-type, deli-style, pita and/or wrapped or rolled

sandwiches." Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note 62 (manuscript at 105) (quoting the
Jimmy John's Non-Competition Covenant). Thus, the agreement left departing

employees entirely free to work for any number of fast-food franchisees, let alone
other possible employers.
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welfare. 292 However, this reasoning seemingly disregards the origin
of at least some such knowledge and abilities-namely, investments
by employers. As explained above, employee noncompete agreements
can protect and thus encourage such investments, overcoming a
market failure. 293
For over four decades now, courts and agencies have recognized
that the propensity of a restraint to overcome a market failure that
unbridled rivalry would otherwise produce constitutes a cognizable
benefit under the Sherman Act and FTC Act, at least when the
market failure stems from imperfect property rights and thus
294
Most
suboptimal incentives that distort parties' economic choices.
propensity
the
that
held
has
repeatedly
notably, the Supreme Court
of a restraint to deter free riding and encourage promotion constitutes
a redeeming virtue, in part because such promotion can enhance
interbrand competition. 295 This conclusion, of course, saves such
restraints from per se condemnation under the Sherman Act. These
conclusions are also relevant to whether such restraints are
necessarily "unfair methods of competition" within the meaning of
Section 5 of the FTC Act.296 Moreover, this realization entitles

292.
293.
294.

See Petition, supra note 7, at 44.
See supra notes 283-89 and accompanying text.
See Meese, supra note 143, at 141-44 (describing case law concluding

that the propensity of a restraint to overcome such market failures constitutes a
redeeming virtue); Newman, supra note 6, at 509-11 (contending that the
propensity of a restraint to overcome a market failure properly constitutes a
redeeming virtue under current law); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,

Inc. v. PSKS, Inc, 551 U.S. 877, 889-92 (2007) (finding that the propensity of
minimum resale price maintenance to combat free riding and encourage dealer
promotion of a manufacturer's products constituted a redeeming virtue that

obviated per se condemnation); Nat'l Soc'y of Pro. Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978) (opining that employee noncompete agreements were
properly subject to assessment under StandardOil's Rule of Reason); Cont'l T.V.,

Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-55 (1977) (finding that the propensity
of exclusive territories to overcome free riding that would occur in a "purely
competitive situation" constituted a redeeming virtue that prevented per se
condemnation of such restraints).

295.

See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889-92 (holding that vertical restraints can

reduce free riding, enhance interbrand competition, and thus produce redeeming

virtues); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724-28 (1988)
(same); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-57 (same); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 101-03 (1984) (embracing similar logic for some
horizontal restraints (citing Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51-57)); Polk Bros., Inc. v.
Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F. 2d 185, 188-89 (7th Cir. 1985) (same).
296. See California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 762, n. 3 (1999) (stating
that Section 5 of the FTC Act "overlaps" the scope of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act); Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 824 (6th Cir. 2011) ("[W]e rely upon
Sherman Act jurisprudence in determining whether the challenged policies

violated Section 5 of the FTC Act." (citing CaliforniaDental, 526 U.S. at 762 n.3)).
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proponents of noncompete agreements to rebut any prima facie case
under the Rule of Reason by offering evidence that they induced
Employee noncompete
employers to provide more training. 2 97
agreements that encourage employee training and/or the production
of information also overcome market failures, enhance the quality of
the employer's product, and foster interbrand competition.
TCE's account of noncompete agreements also undermines any
claim that such agreements are necessarily the result of some defect
in the bargaining process. Just as manufacturers can employ costbased price differentials to induce dealers to enter nonstandard
contracts, so too can employers adopt a similar tactic to induce
employees voluntarily to accept such terms. 298 That is, employers
could offer prospective employees two options: (1) employment at will,
at a lower wage with no safeguard; and (2) employment subject to a
contractual safeguard, namely, a noncompete agreement, at a higher
wage. The gap between the wages offered will reflect the fact that,
with no safeguard (the low-wage option), employers will make few, if
any, investments in general human capital and thus forgo the
opportunity to enhance the firm's own output. Such a differential
would not reflect an exercise of employer bargaining power, even if
the employer possesses monopsony power, but would instead
constitute a cost-based wage differential. 299 Employers would use any
monopsony power to depress the wage terms that accompany both
contractual options without altering the magnitude of the
differential.
This model of contract formation generates a prediction about the
relationship between such agreements, on the one hand, and wages,
on the other. That is, other things being equal, one would expect
employees who knowingly enter such agreements to receive higher
wages than those employees who are not so subject. Empirical
evidence discussed below apparently confirms this prediction. 30 0
The analysis in this Subpart vindicates and bolsters the decision
by federal antitrust courts to assess employee noncompete
agreements under a fact-intensive Rule of Reason, leaving states free
to impose their own regulations, subject to the constraints of
297. See, e.g., Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 827-28 (6th Cir. 2011);
Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 265-68 (7th Cir. 1981).
298. See, e.g., Rubin & Shedd, supra note 278, at 100.
299. Two scholars articulated a similar account of how employers induce
voluntary acceptance of such agreements. Id. ("[B]oth parties must prospectively
expect to benefit from the agreement, independently of their respective
bargaining power. If an employer places a restrictive clause in an employment
contract, he will reduce the supply of potential employees and thus pay a higher

wage to those persons who nonetheless choose to work for him. Employers will
not put clauses in contracts unless the gain to the employer from including the

clause is greater than the cost in higher wages which the contract will entail.").
300. See infra notes 368-69 and accompanying text (discussing this evidence).
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competitive federalism. 30 1 Indeed, such an analysis and data
discussed below may also induce some states to relax their own
approaches to employee noncompete agreements, at least with
30 2
respect to those agreements about which employees are not aware.
To be sure, the Supreme Court has opined that conduct need not
violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act to constitute "unfair
competition." 30 3 Instead, contracts can also be "unfair methods of
competition" if the Commission determines them to be "against public
policy for other reasons."30 4
The Petition does not discuss the possibility that employee
noncompete agreements are voluntary. Nor does it explain what
public policy voluntary noncompete agreements might violate.
Voluntary employee noncompete agreements are not, as a class,
"unfair methods of competition."
The Less Restrictive Alternatives Adduced by AbolitionistsAre
C.
Less Effective and/or More Costly to Administer than Employee
Noncompete Agreements
Even if forced to concede that employee noncompete agreements
often produce significant benefits, at least some Abolitionists
nonetheless persist in their view that such restraints should be
condemned without exception. In particular, Abolitionists contend
that employers can always achieve any benefits that noncompete
agreements might produce in ways that are less harmful to employees
and society. 305 As a result, they say, banning all such agreements
enhances competition and individual autonomy without depriving
society of any benefits. 306 If Abolitionists are correct on this score,
identification of such agreements as "inherently suspect" will always
result in condemnation by a court or agency because attempts to
307
justify such restraints will necessarily fail.
"less restrictive
of purported
invocation
Abolitionists'
alternatives" echoes inhospitality era critiques of nonstandard
agreements.3 0 8 However, practitioners of TCE have demonstrated
301.

See Epstein, supra note

180, at 336 (explaining how hostility to

noncompete agreements "ignore[es] the efficiency justifications that would
matter under a rule of reason approach").

302.

Cf. Techworks, LLC v. Wille, 770 N.W.2d 727, 732 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009)

("[T]he employer has the burden to prove that a noncompete agreement is
reasonable .... ").

303. See Indian Federationof Dentists, 476 U.S. at 454 (citing FTC v. Sperry
Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972)).
304. Id.
305. See Petition, supra note 7, at 46-48.
306. See id. at 4.
307. Id. at 4 & n.6.
308. Leading scholars and the Supreme Court invoked the supposed
availability of less restrictive alternatives to support per se condemnation of tying
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that less restrictive alternatives proffered in various contexts are less
effective, more costly to administer, or both.309 Consider the claim,
described earlier, that "territor[ies] of primary responsibility" were
less restrictive means of achieving the same benefits as vertically
obtained exclusive territories. 31 0 This contention made perfect sense
if one assumed away information costs, bargaining costs, monitoring
costs, and adjudication costs. 3 1 1 In a cost-free world, manufacturers
could freely assess the costs and payoffs of various local promotional
strategies, costlessly determining the optimal promotional strategy
for each dealer. The manufacturer could then costlessly communicate
individualized strategies to each dealer and then costlessly monitor
The manufacturer could then terminate
dealers' compliance.
noncompliant dealers, costlessly defending against any resulting
litigation. 3 12
Such costs exist in the real world, however, with the result that
such clauses are poor substitutes for an exclusive territory. In
particular, exclusive territories allow manufacturers to delegate the
determination and execution of promotional strategies to individual
dealers who have superior access to local knowledge.3 13 Each such
dealer will capture the costs and benefits of its promotional
investments and thus make optimal promotional decisions. 314 In
short, contractually conferred exclusive territories create the
equivalent of a property right, buttressing the decentralized system
of distribution the manufacturer has chosen. 315 Similar shortcomings
316
beset other less restrictive means that parties have advanced.
contracts. See Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics, supra note

174, at 71-72, 85-86 (describing this case law and commentary).
309. Id. at 74.
310. See Turner, supra note 151, at 699.
311.

At the

same time,

the implicit

concession that some contractual

constraints on dealer conduct were necessary in this context rested on a belief
that dealers would behave opportunistically by refusing to engage in sufficient
promotion. See id. at 698-99.
312. See supra note 157 and accompanying text

(describing presumed

operation of primary responsibility clauses).
313. See Meese, supra note 260, at 559-60.
314. Id. at 602-05; see also Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per
Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division II, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 467-69 (1966)
(explaining how "areas of primary responsibility" do not adequately serve the
procompetitive interest furthered by exclusive territories and are more expensive

to administer).
315. See Bork, supranote 263, at 956 (describing "vertical market division" as
"closely analogous to the social recognition of property rights as a means of
inducing economic activities"); Meese, supra note 260, at 602-04.
316. See, e.g., Bork, supranote 314, at 466-67 (describing shortcomings of less
restrictive "profit pass-over system[s]"); Victor P. Goldberg, The Law and
Economics of Vertical Restrictions:A Relational Perspective, 58 TEX. L. REV. 91,
110-11 (1979) (arguing that less restrictive alternatives to vertical distribution
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As Abolitionists themselves suggest, employee noncompete
agreements can create a "quasi property right," thereby incentivizing
3 17
Like
investments in training and the production of information.
by
proposed
alternatives
primary responsibility clauses, the
of
such
objectives
the
Abolitionists are inferior means of achieving
contractual property rights. Initially, it should be emphasized that
current law already includes an assessment of some less restrictive
alternatives. 318 That is, state courts assessing such agreements
under contract law condemn employee noncompete agreements that
are broader than necessary in time, space, or definition of the
319
industry to achieve the employer's legitimate objectives.
Abolitionists would nonetheless ban restraints that survive such
significant scrutiny.
It is also important to consider the implications of how such
agreements arise in the first place. Some arise in unconcentrated
labor markets, and employers usually disclose such agreements in
Others result from intensive bargaining between
advance. 320
Presumably, parties operating in
sophisticated parties. 32 1
competitive markets and/or engaging in such bargaining would adopt
alternatives if they produced greater net benefits. The decision to
adopt noncompete agreements instead suggests that the proposed
alternatives are more costly, less effective, or both.322 Consideration

restraints are less effective); Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and
Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 345, 353-54 (1985);
Alan- J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of
FranchiseTying Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REv. 111, 149-51 (1996) (detailing how
less restrictive means of achieving same benefits as franchise tying contracts are

less effective and more costly); Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical
Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. REV. 143, 191-92 (1977)
[hereinafter Meese, Vertical Restraints] (explaining that less restrictive
alternative of contracting separately for dealer services rests on the unrealistic
assumption that bargaining, information, and monitoring costs are zero); see also

WILLIAMSON, supra note 127, at 187 ("[I]t is less costly to police simple systems
than it is to police more complicated ones.").

317. See Petition, supra note 7, at 39.
318. See Blake, supranote 20, at 674-75.
319. Id.
320. See Evan Starr, Consider This: Training, Wages, and the Enforceability
of Covenants Not to Compete, 72 ILR REV. 783, 788 (2019).
321. See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 30, at 1038-39 ("[I]n the case of
top-level executives, the full negotiation assumption almost always holds true as
these agreements are typically entered into with the advice of highly
sophisticated counsel specialized in executive compensation matters."); Bishara
et al., supra note 208, at 3, 28 (estimating that 80 percent of the CEOs of firms
in the S&P 1500 were subject to noncompete agreements).

322. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210,
221 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (explaining that adoption of nonstandard agreement in a
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of the three alternatives Abolitionists have proposed confirms this
inference.
Consider first the proposed alternative of confidentiality
agreements that prevent former employees from revealing trade
secrets. 32 3 Even if such agreements completely prevent the release of
trade secrets, they do nothing to protect the fruits of the employer's
investments in the production of general human capital or capital
investments complementary to highly trained employees. 324
Departing employees would thus remain entirely free to take newly
obtained skills to the highest, free-riding bidder. A rational employer
would anticipate such defection and decline to make such
investments.

Even as respects trade secrets, confidentiality agreements would
fall short compared to employee noncompete agreements. Arguments
to the contrary reflect the sort of price-theoretic assumptions that
informed the inhospitality tradition, including the assumption of
costless monitoring. 32 5
Like
primary responsibility clauses,
nondisclosure agreements would require the original employer
continually to expend resources monitoring ex-employees, wherever
employed, to determine whether they have disclosed such
information. 326 If a breach occurs, the former employer will have to
competitive market reflects party's effort "to make the conduct of their business
more effective").

323. See Petition, supra note 7, at 50.
324. See Jessica S. Jeffers, The Impact of Restricting Labor Mobility on
CorporateInvestment and Entrepreneurship22-23 (Jan. 3, 2018) (unpublished
at
(available
manuscript),
https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2018/preliminary/paper/sRa8K2DN)

(discussing research concluding that enforcement of such agreements can induce
such capital investment).

325. See Meese, supra note 187, at 54-55; Meese, Vertical Restraints, supra
note 316, at 191-92.
326. Two scholars not friendly to employee noncompete agreements have
asserted that trade secret law does not suffice to prevent former employees from
sharing such secrets with a new employer. See Blake, supra note 20, at 669-70

("An injunction not to disclose can seldom undo or effectively prevent the doing
of real damage. Even in the best of good faith, a former technical or 'creative'
employee working for a competitor, or in business for himself in the same or a
related field, can hardly prevent his knowledge of his former employer's

confidential methods or data from showing up in his work. And utmost good faith
cannot always be expected.

Thus, from the employer's point of view a more

effective preventative is badly needed.

. .

. The most effective protective device is

an enforceable postemployment covenant not to compete." (emphasis added));

Posner, supra note 62, at 180 ("[I]t may be difficult to identify a theft [of trade
secrets] because the employee may simply rely on her knowledge of those trade
secrets while improving the production processes of the new employer. . . . The

noncompete thus helps employers fill a gap in the enforceability of trade secret
law." (emphasis added)); see also Lester, supra note 278, at 53 ("Trade secret law
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sue a former employee who may deny wrongdoing. Such lawsuits are
not costless, and courts are imperfect arbiters of conflicting testimony
that may reflect good-faith disagreements about the source of
particular knowledge. Finally, even a successful suit may leave the
former employer empty-handed because the ex-employee may be
judgment proof, while equitable relief may arrive after the former
employee has disclosed such information to others. 327 Courts of
equity cannot erase memories.

Abolitionists also claim that employers can increase employee
compensation to prevent post-training defection to rivals. 328 This
alternative fares no better, ignoring as it does revised scientific
understanding of nonstandard agreements. For one thing, both
theory and evidence cited below suggest that, in many cases,
employers are already paying significant premia to induce agreement
to noncompete provisions. 329

The admonition to pay unrestrained employees a premium to
fend off post-investment bids by free-riding rivals falls flat. By
definition, such opportunistic bidders have not incurred the cost of
training and/or the production of information that has enhanced the
Because such rivals have not
employee's general productivity.
incurred such costs, they will be able profitably to outbid the employer
who did incur such costs. 3 30 Assuming there is no noncompete
agreement and the employee is equally productive at both firms, the
employer who made such investments will either lose the bidding
contest or prevail by making a bid that, when combined with the sunk
cost of training and/or production of information, is greater than the
employee's marginal contribution to the firm. While unprofitable ex
post as an accounting matter, such a bid would be rational short-run
behavior because the original employer's cost of training and/or
producing information is sunk. 33 1 Even so, the rational original
...
does not completely allay employer concerns.... Restrictive covenants, then,
fill a gap where other legal and extra-legal mechanisms fall short.").

327.

See Blake, supra note 20, at 669 ("An injunction not to disclose can

seldom undo or effectively prevent ... the real damage.").
328. See Petition, supra note 7, at 50.

329.

See infra notes 343-51 and accompanying text.

If they are not, the

proper remedy would be to require additional pre-contractual disclosure as a
condition of enforcement.
330. One Abolitionist scholar apparently ignored the role of sunk costs when

he claimed that "[t]he old employer is at no systematic disadvantage in these
negotiations." See Hyde, supranote 62, at 10.

331.

The original employer is analogous to the firm that makes substantial

investments in identifying an undervalued takeover target. Once the firm makes

a tender offer for shares of the target, firms that have
but place equal value on the target can free ride on
outbid the original bidder. While the original bidder
its bid, the resulting price, when combined with the

not made such investments
such search and profitably
may still prevail by raising
sunk costs of searching for
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employer could only hope to match, and not exceed, the outside bid.
Unless one assumes that any "tie" always goes to the original
employer, this counterbidding alternative will be less effective at
retaining employees than a noncompete agreement.
To this point in the analysis, reliance on counterbidding by the
original employer has no efficiency consequences and merely alters
the distribution of rewards of economic activity between the original
employer and (now) former employee, in favor of the latter. However,
Williamson's admonition to examine a contract "in the entirety"
counsels that we consider the passage of time beyond simply the
bidding contest. 332 While rational in the short run, counterbidding by
the original employer will produce negative profits. Employers who
anticipate that noncompete agreements will be unenforceable will
rightly believe they can only retain employees by making such
unprofitable counterbids. Such employers will therefore decline to
make (sunk) investments in enhancing general human capital in the
Banning noncompete agreements and relegating
first place.
employers to the less restrictive alternative of counterbidding against
free-riding rivals will thus predictably reduce investment in employee
training to the detriment of employees, employers, and the rest of
society. Worker productivity and GDP will suffer accordingly.
Finally, the alternative of entering into long-term binding
agreements also falls short. 333 Here again, developments in economic
science in the form of TCE, along with real-world data, undermine
As explained earlier, it appears that many such
this claim.
agreements arise in competitive markets in which parties have
rejected this alternative. 334 It is not difficult to see why. Recall that
nonstandard contracts arise in the context of relational contracting,
in which performance by both parties unfolds over time in conditions
of uncertainty, thereby requiring adjustments to changed
conditions. 335 Within this context, employee training is not a single
discrete event, the exact quantity and nature of which the parties can
the undervalued company, will exceed the bidder's gains from the transaction.

See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in
Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1982). Knowing that a search will likely
lead to such an unprofitable yet "winning" bid, the putative bidder will refrain

from searching (and bidding) in the first place. See id. In the same way, an
employer who knows that it will only be able to retain an employee it has trained
by tendering an unprofitable but rational bid will decline to invest in such

training in the first place.
332. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 127, at 35 (emphasis omitted).
333. See Petition, supra note 7, at 46, 48.
334. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210,
221 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (explaining that adoption of nonstandard agreement in a
competitive market reflects parties' effort to "make conduct of their business

more effective").
335. See Williamson, supra note 126, at 181-82.
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predict ex ante. 336 Instead, training will likely take several forms,
both formal and informal, including unquantifiable "learning by
doing." Indeed, literature cited by Abolitionists concludes that firms
33 7
often engage employees in multiple training events over time.
Moreover, firms will presumably adjust training in response to
industry changes, new product offerings, evolving understandings of
employee capabilities, and opportunity costs of such training, which
will fluctuate along with the demand for the firm's product and thus
productivity of employees. 338 In such settings, characterized by
bounded rationality, it is not realistic to expect firms years in advance
to "determine an employment term that is just long enough to recoup
their investment in the intangibles." 339 As a result, noncompete
provisions will often be the least imperfect method of protecting
employer investments in training and/or the production and sharing
of information.
D. Some Evidence in Recent Economic Literature Confirms the
Predictionsof TCE that Many Such Agreements Produce Significant
Benefits
We need not rely solely upon the inference to be drawn from the
apparent presence of numerous employee noncompete agreements in
unconcentrated markets, combined with TCE's theoretical account.
Abolitionists themselves cite academic research suggesting that a
nontrivial portion of such agreements produce important

336.

See Starr, supra note 320, at 796 tbl.4, 797 (describing positive

correlation between state-level enforceability of noncompete agreements and
number of discrete training events).

337. Id. at 797-98.
338. See Petition, supranote 7, at 42-43; see also Barnett & Sichelman, supra
note 30, at 987-88 (opining that reliance on a long-term employment contract
"may be unattractive to both employers and employees because it locks each
party into a potentially unwanted long-term commitment that is difficult to
mitigate even through the most carefully crafted provisions for early separation
under certain circumstances"); Rubin & Shedd, supra note 278, at 98 ("It may,

however, be difficult or impossible to draft a contract with sufficient specificity to
include only the training that the employer desires to protect. The employer may
not know in advance for exactly what sort of work a particular employee is best
suited, and thus may not be able to specify contractually which information is to
be protected. Moreover, the details of trade secrets often cannot be written down;
the secret may consist of a series of actions involving a particular process.").

339.

Petition, supra note 7, at 48. Invocation of this alternative rests on the

price-theoretic assumption that firms have perfect information about the optimal
training investments for each employee. Abolitionists have thus embraced the
sort of textbook model of market processes that they purport to reject. See id. at

23-24 (describing
formation).

Abolitionists'

rejection of textbook

model of contract
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For instance, the Petition invokes (for other
efficiencies. 34 0
propositions) an econometric study that concludes that three-fifths of
sampled employees learned of their noncompete agreement binding
Others hostile to such
them before accepting employment. 341
agreements have invoked the same study, again for other
propositions. 342 Perhaps more importantly, this study finds a positive
and statistically significant correlation between an employee's
knowing agreement to a noncompete agreement, on the one hand, and
the amount of training received, on the other. 343 The same study also
finds that employees who knowingly enter such agreements receive
greater access to information, higher wages, and greater job
In
satisfaction than those not bound by such agreements. 344
particular, this study finds that employees who learn of noncompete
agreements before they accept a job offer earn wages that are nearly
10 percent higher than employees not subject to any such agreement,
other things being equal. 345
A previous article by one coauthor of this study reached some
similar conclusions. 346 The article studied the relationship between
individual states' propensity to enforce noncompete agreements and
the amount and type of training that employees in that state

340. See, e.g., Starr et al., supra note 183, at 69.
341. Id. ("61 percent of individuals with a noncompete first learn [of it] before
accepting their job offers, while approximately 30 percent first learn. . . only after

they have already accepted. . . ."). The Petition cited a previous, unpublished
version of this article. See Petition, supra note 7, at 6 n.8, 34 & n.150. A different
study concludes that almost 70 percent of a much smaller and narrower sample
(electrical and electronics engineers) did not receive notice of such agreements
until after they accepted the offer of employment. See Matt Marx & Lee Fleming,
Non-Compete Agreements: Barriers to Entry ...

and Exit?, 12 INNOvATION POL'Y

& ECON. 39, 49 (2012).
342. See, e.g., LEMLEY & LOBEL, supra note 62, at 3 n.7 (citing draft version of
Starr et al., supra note 183); Posner, supra note 62, at 166 n.5 (citing previous,

unpublished version of same study); Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note 62
(manuscript at 102 n.5) (citing a draft version of Starr et al., supra note 183).
343. Starr et al., supra note 183, at 57 tbl.1; id. at 75 ("With regard to those
who learn of their noncompete before they accept their job offers, our most
093
saturated model indicates that these employees have 9.7 percent (e ) higher
earnings, are 4.3 percentage points more likely to have information shared with
them (a 7.8 percent increase relative to the sample average), are 5.5 percentage
points more likely to have received training in the last year (an 11 percent

increase), and are 4.5 percentage points more likely to be satisfied in their jobs
(a 6.6 percent increase) relative to employees without a noncompete." (emphasis
added)).
344.

Id. at 57 tbl.1 ("Noncompetes are associated with more training, greater

access to information, and higher wages and job satisfaction
noncompete is presented along with the job offer[.]").
345. Id. at 75.
346. See Starr, supra note 320, at 796 tbl.4, 797-98.

when the
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receive. 347 The article found that, controlling for other factors that
could impact levels of training, employees in states with an average
level of enforcement of noncompete agreements receive almost 15
percent more training than employees in states with the lowest level
of enforcement. 348 The same paper also found a positive correlation
between such enforceability and the number of "training events" that
employees experienced, that such training was "likely to be more
costly" than "simple on-the-job training taught by a co-worker," and
349
that employers paid for such additional training.
Another study cited by the Petition found that physicians who
entered into such agreements earned higher salaries than physicians
who did not, other things being equal.35 0 The same study also found
a positive correlation between the strength of state enforcement of
such provisions and wages.3 51
Yet another study concludes that robust enforcement of
noncompete agreements apparently reduces the number of new spinoff firms within industries but that those firms that are created are
of higher quality and endure longer than those in states with less

347. Id. at 795-98.
348. Id. at 795-97.
349. Id. at 797-98; id. at 798 ("Taken together, the results provided here
suggest a strong positive relationship between noncompete enforceability and the
firm's willingness to invest in multiple training events that tend to be off-site or
outsider taught and that are primarily meant to upgrade skills and teach new

skills.").
350.

Petition, supranote 7, at 34 & n.149; Kurt Lavetti et al., Buying Loyalty:

Theory and Evidence from Physicians 33-34 (Oct. 26, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript)

(available

at

https://www.sole-jole.org/assets/docs/13228.pdf)

[hereinafter Lavetti et al., Buying Loyalty]. The published version of this paper
is: Kurt Lavetti et al., The Impact of Restricting Mobility of Skilled Service
Workers: Evidence from Physicians, 55 J. HUM. RES. 1025 (2020) [hereinafter
Lavetti et al., Impact of Restricting Mobility].
351. The unpublished version of the study, helpfully cited by the Petition,
offers the following observation:
The theory of compensating wage differentials suggests that earnings
levels should be higher for workers with NCAs, who accept restrictions
on their occupational choice sets. Of course, firms are only willing to

pay a wage differential if they benefit sufficiently from the use of NCAs.
Overcoming investment holdups by assigning property rights with

NCAs, leading to higher productivity, creates rents than can be shared
between workers and firms.

Lavetti et al., Buying Loyalty, supra note 350, at 26-27; see also id. at 27
("[H]ourly earnings of workers with NCAs in their contracts are about 14%
higher, conditional on observed worker and firm characteristics and unobserved
market effects."). The published version reports that "the present value of the

future wage differential associated with NCAs is between $149,000-$274,000
when the rate of time preference varies between 10 percent and 2 percent."

Lavetti et al., Impact of RestrictingMobility, supra note 350, at 1060.
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robust enforcement. 35 2 Finally, a yet unpublished study finds a
positive and statistically significant relationship between state
enforcement of noncompete agreements and firm-level capital
investments. 35 3 The author surmises that enhanced enforceability
encourages firms to invest in physical capital that is complementary
to employees who are trained to use such equipment. 35 4 Such
additional investments presumably enhance the productivity of
workers and thus enhance the nation's overall output.3 5 5
In sum, the academic literature discussed above confirms the
predictions of TCE that noncompete agreements often overcome a
market failure and encourage investments in worker training.3 56
Such investments improve the quality of products that employers
offer, enhancing interbrand competition and producing unambiguous
social benefits. 35 7 Moreover, these benefits are cognizable under the
Sherman Act and the FTC Act. 358 These data also contradict any
claim-made by the Petition and apparently echoed by the
Commission itself-that employee noncompete agreements are
generally one-sided contracts of adhesion. 35 9 Instead, these data are
consistent with TCE's prediction that employers can induce
employees to enter such agreements voluntarily by offering higher
wages that compensate employees for post-employment restrictions
352.

See

Evan

Starr

et

al.,

Screening Spinouts?: How

Noncompete

EnforceabilityAffects the Creation, Growth and Survival of New Firms, 64 MGMT.

Sci. 552, 553 (2018).
353. See Jeffers, supra note 324, at 23 ("These results point to an important
trade-off of labor mobility, between encouraging the entrance of new firms on the
one hand and investment at existing firms on the other hand.").

354.

Id. at 3-4 ("In particular, if human capital is hard to replace and its

relationship with physical capital is complementary-for example, expensive
computers are worth acquiring if the firm can retain talented programmers-

then tighter restrictions on labor mobility will increase the rate of capital
investment. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that in firms that are more
highly dependent on human capital, the net capital investment rate rises.").

355. See Alan J. Meese, Section 2 Enforcement and the Great Recession: Why
Less (Enforcement) Might Mean More (GDP), 80 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1633, 1677-78
(2012) (explaining that refusal to ban wealth-creating practices will facilitate
optimal allocation of scarce resources, increase potential output, and encourage

economic growth).
356.

See supra notes 343-49 and accompanying text.

357. See Starr et al., supra note 183, at 54; cf. Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889-92 (2007) (holding that vertical intrabrand
restraints can reduce free riding, enhance interbrand competition, and thus
produce redeeming virtues).

358.

See supra notes 294-97 and accompanying text.

359. See Petition, supra note 7, at 23; FTC Request for Public Comment, supra
note 12 (referring to "non-compete clauses that prevent workers from seeking

employment with other firms, and other one-sided contract terms that may
exacerbate or lock in power disparities").
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on their autonomy, thereby sharing with them a portion of the
productivity gains associated with enhanced training. 360
These data also refute the claim, made by Abolitionists and
others, that all employee noncompete agreements are "inherently
361
suspect" and thus presumptively violate the Sherman Act.
According to a leading decision the Petition invokes, a class of
agreement is "inherently suspect" if it bears a "close family
resemblance [to] another practice that already stands convicted in the
court of consumer welfare." 36 2 Invoking this standard, Eric Posner,
for instance, contends that courts should presume all such
agreements unlawful because "[t]he empirical literature suggests
that noncompetes typically cause anticompetitive harm-in the form
of lower wages for workers."36 3 Professor Posner cites a study that
finds an association between average enforcement of noncompete
36 4
Some
agreements and a 4 percent reduction in average wages.
360. This is not to say that negotiating across a proverbial bargaining table
always or usually precedes the adoption of such beneficial agreements that

increase employee wages. Cf. Posner, supra note 62, at 185 (concluding that such
agreements do not compensate employees for constraints on their autonomy
because "the empirical literature on noncompetes shows that workers and
employers rarely bargain over noncompetes"). Markets often produce wealthcreating results for transacting parties without such individualized (and costly)

bargaining.

For instance, knowledgeable bargaining by a subset of employees

can produce efficient terms and thus protect employees who do not engage in such
bargaining, so long as firms employ standard agreements that treat all parties
who are similarly situated the same. See supra notes 219-24 and accompanying
Moreover, firms that adopt wealth-creating
text (explaining this result).
practices will to that extent thrive at the expense of rivals who do not, even if
they cannot explain why such agreements enhance their success. See, e.g., Armen

A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211,
211, 212-13 (1950); id. at 216 ("If explanation of past results rather than
prediction is the task, the economist can diagnose the particular attributes which
were critical in facilitating survival, even though individual participants were
not aware of them."). Finally, it may well be that some such agreements are

offered on a "take it or leave it" basis. However, such standardization is also one
attribute of a well-functioning competitive market.
361. See Petition, supra note 7, at 4 & n.6. Indeed, one scholar advanced this
contention during the waning years of the inhospitality era. See Sullivan, supra
note 55, at 650 n.126 (contending that the "existence of [such] a contract" should

establish a prima facie case of illegality, thereby shifting the burden to the
defendant); id. at 642 (invoking United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. as
persuasive precedent, 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)).
362. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see
Petition, supranote 7, at 4 n.6 (invoking the FTC decision affirmed in Polygram);
Posner, supra note 62, at 194 n.27 (also invoking Polygram); see also 1-800
Contacts, Inc. v. FTC, 1 F.4th 102, 115 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Polygram).
363. Posner, supra note 62, at 194.
364. Id. at 187; see Starr, supra note 320, at 785.
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Abolitionists invoke the same empirical finding to justify banning
such agreements, in part because of their supposed negative effect on
income distribution.3 6 5
This argument overstates the empirical results reported by the
single study invoked. The study does not purport to identify the
impact of a "typical" noncompete clause. Instead, the study reports
that, on average, wages are 4 percent lower in states with normal
levels of enforcement.36 6 But the author also qualifies these findings.
In particular, the article explains that the main driver of this result
is a reduction in the wages of employees in states that allow
enforcement of noncompete agreements imposed after employees
have accepted the offer of employment without any requirement of
additional consideration.3 6 7
As explained earlier, the same author has also found that 61
percent of employee noncompete agreements are disclosed before
employees accept employment.3 6 8 Moreover, when employers do
disclose such agreements, employees bound by them earn
significantly higher wages than similarly situated employees not
bound by such agreements.3 69 Taken together and viewed in their
entirety, these data suggest two distinct results. First, the average
impact of employee noncompete agreements is to reduce wages, and

this result is driven by a subset of atypical employee noncompete
agreements, i.e., those not initially disclosed to employees. Second,
where employee noncompete agreements are disclosed, and the
typical agreement is disclosed, employees receive higher wages than
they would have received had they not entered into such agreements.
These higher wages presumably reflect the parties' expectationsconfirmed by the data-that such agreements will induce additional
training and/or the production of information. 370
These results do not justify a finding that employee noncompete
agreements have a "close family resemblance" to agreements deemed
unlawful per se. 371 Instead, it appears that a substantial proportion
produce significant benefits, partially captured by employees via
365. See LEMLEY & LOBEL, supra note 62, at 3 ("Noncompetes decrease wages."
(citing Starr, supra note 320, at 785)); Petition, supra note 7, at 33 (citing an
unpublished draft of Starr, supra note 320).
366. Starr, supra note 320, at 785.

367. Id. at 806-07.
368. Starr et al., supra note 183, at 69.
369. Id. at 75.
370. Id. (summarizing findings that "those who learn of their noncompete
before they accept their job offers . . . are 5.5 percentage points more likely to
have received training in the last year (an 11 percent increase)"). See also Starr,

supra note

320, at 797-98

(finding positive correlation between robust

enforcement of employee noncompete agreements and quantity of employee

training).
371. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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higher wages. Presumptively banning all noncompete agreements
because of their supposed effect on average wages will throw the
proverbial baby out with the bathwater and thus unnecessarily
destroy wealth.
To be sure, regulatory regimes must sometimes rely on clear
rules that ban (or allow) particular conduct, and such rules will be
overinclusive or underinclusive. 372 As then-Judge Breyer once
explained, the cost of assessing the exact impact of each type of
The benefits of additional
conduct would be prohibitive. 373
investigation do not always warrant the costs. However, if the
anticipated impact on wages should drive the treatment of employee
noncompete agreements, the cost of discriminating between contracts
likely to reduce such wages and those likely to increase them is
extremely low. Agencies and courts need simply ask whether the
employer disclosed the agreement before acceptance. If the answer is
"yes," any presumption that such an agreement will reduce wages
must evaporate. If anything, the presumption should shift in favor of
a conclusion that the agreement will produce net benefits. 374
Finally, these data undermine Abolitionists' account of the harm
that these agreements supposedly produce. Recall that Abolitionists
and others contend that employee noncompete agreements prevent
former employees from selling their services to the highest bidder,
thereby reducing their wages below what a free market would
produce. 375 This account treats hypothesized bids and resulting
imagined (higher) wages as a baseline against which to measure the
supposed impact of enforceable employee noncompete agreements. 376
As is often the case with nonstandard agreements, focusing on
the impact of a restraint at a particular moment in time can produce
misleading results.377 Instead, TCE teaches that we must examine
372. Competing examples include the per se rule against horizontal price
fixing (overinclusive) and the per se legality under Section 2 of the Sherman Act
of above-cost pricing (underinclusive). Both such bright line rules depend in part

upon the belief that the cost of more refined assessment exceeds the benefits.
373. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir.
1983) (Breyer, J.) ("[W]hile technical economic discussion helps to inform the
antitrust laws, those laws cannot precisely replicate the economists' (sometimes
conflicting) views.... Rules that seek to embody every economic complexity and
qualification may well, through the vagaries of administration, prove counterproductive, undercutting the very economic ends they seek to serve.").

374.

See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. FTC, 1 F.4th 102, 115-17 (2d Cir. 2021)

(rejecting "inherently suspect" label because defendants articulated "cognizable
procompetitive justifications").

375.
376.
377.

See Posner, supra note 62, at 190.

Id.
See Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th

Cir. 1985) ("A legal rule that enforces covenants not to compete, even after an
employee has launched his own firm, makes it easier for people to cooperate
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the contract "in its entirety." 378 Such examination reveals that the
prospect of the outside bidding that noncompete agreements may
prevent is not exogenous to the enforceability of noncompete
agreements. 379 The prospect of such bidding turns upon the amount
and type of training that the original employer provides before such
bids. Absent a noncompete agreement, the employer may not supply
any training or may only supply training specific to the firm. The
wage that the employee can command in the marketplace may then
be lower than what the employee is earning at the firm.
In short, the harm that Abolitionists and others attribute to
employee noncompete agreements-deterrence of outside bids and
depression of wages-depends upon a nonrestraint baseline of high
bids and resulting wages that may be entirely imaginary and unlikely
Such
to occur absent enforcement of noncompete agreements.
agreements are frequently necessary to induce the very investments

that enhance employees' general human capital and give rise to
outside bidding in the first place. In these circumstances, banning
such agreements will deter such training, eliminate the prospect of
outside bidding, and thus not increase wages. Like inhospitality
opponents of exclusive territories, Abolitionists and others want
employees to "have their cake and eat it too," that is, atomistic
competition for labor, unconstrained by a noncompete agreement, and
robust bidding by other employers. However, this fortunate result is
often not a sustainable equilibrium because the prospect of atomistic
rivalry in the labor market would deter the very training that gives
rise to robust outside bidding. Antitrust presumptions must rest on
"actual market realities" and not on wishful thinking about the
impact of banning certain restraints. 380 There is simply no basis for
any presumption that employee noncompete agreements usually or
typically suppress wages compared to what employees could earn in
a nonrestraint world. Any claim that such agreements generally
reduce wages compared to a state of affairs without such contracts
presumes the existence of employee productivity and bids that would
not exist but for the agreements.

productively in the first place. Knowing that he is not cutting his own throat by

doing so, the employer will train the employee, giving him skills, knowledge and
trade secrets that make the firm more productive. Once that employment ends,
there is nothing left but restraint-but the aftermath is the wrong focus."

(emphasis added)).
WILLIAMSON, supra note 127, at 35 (emphasis omitted).
379. But cf. Lobel, supranote 108, at 845-48 (apparently assuming that firms
will create human capital regardless of ability to capture benefits of doing so).
380. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992)
378.

("Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual

market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law.").
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VII. THE UNLIKELY PROSPECT THAT EMPLOYERS WILL USE SUCH
AGREEMENTS TO PROTECT OR GAIN MARKET POWER IN THE PRODUCT
MARKET DOES NOT SUPPORT ABOLITION

Abolitionists also contend that employers can use employee
noncompete agreements to protect or obtain power in the product
market by depriving rivals of access to labor inputs or entrepreneurial
talent, raising rivals' costs and thus allowing the employer to price
above its own costs.3 81 Such a strategy is theoretically possible.
Under the right conditions, employers could pay employees a wage
premium to prevent them from accepting outside bids or starting
competing firms. Such exclusionary rights agreements could be
entirely voluntary, like a cartel agreement or exclusive dealing
contract. 382 If the enforcement agencies learn that a firm has adopted
such a strategy, they should pursue the perpetrators under the
Sherman Act or the FTC Act.
However, several necessary conditions must exist before such a
strategy can succeed. 383 Both the relevant product market and the
relevant input market (here, the labor market) must be susceptible to
such a strategy. 384 The challenged agreement must result in
sufficient foreclosure of the relevant input market to impact the
input's market price. 385 The input must constitute a nontrivial share
of the cost of the final product. 386 Moreover, there must be barriers
to entry in the relevant input and product markets. 387 Finally, the

381.

See Petition, supra note 7, at 38.

382.

See Meese, Market Power and Contract Formation, supra note 174, at

1369 ("While such agreements may appear to be the result of market power, close
analysis suggests that they are instead the result of purely voluntary integration,
to wit, a process of contract formation whereby the proponent of the agreement

offers the input supplier a discount if it agrees to the exclusive arrangement,
Thus, such
thereby sharing expected market power with the supplier.
agreements are no more 'coercive' than a garden-variety cartel agreement,
whereby rivals voluntarily decide to reduce output .... ").

383. See generally Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 101, at 236-38, 250-51
(articulating conditions necessary to achieve "Real Foreclosure" that raises rivals'
costs sufficiently to confer market power on the proponent of the agreement);

Williamson, supra note 259, at 960 ("[A]nticompetitive effects [of nonstandard
contracts] can appear only if rather special structural conditions exist."). See also

Alan J. Meese, Raising Rivals' Costs: Can the Agencies Do More Good than
Harm?, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 241, 269-70 (2003). Of course, in some
circumstances, the exclusionary agreement can itself constitute a barrier to entry
by depriving potential entrants of reasonably priced inputs, thus placing them at

a disadvantage vis-a-vis incumbent firms.
384. See Meese, supranote 174, at 269.
385. See id.
386. Id.
387. Id.

706

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

victims of the scheme must lack effective counterstrategies that
would thwart an otherwise plausible plan. 3 88
Even the scholars who first articulated the raising rivals' costs
paradigm have opined that most industries are not susceptible to
such a strategy, i.e., that such a strategy can only be successful in a
minority subset of American markets.3 8 9 In addition, the industries
that are susceptible to such a strategy via the labor market, as
opposed to contracts governing other input markets, would
After all, some
presumably constitute a subset of this subset.
successful raising rivals' costs strategies will entail increasing the
costs of inputs other than labor.
The Petition offers no evidence that a substantial portion of
employee noncompete agreements raise rivals' costs and thus help
their proponents obtain market power. For instance, the Petition
offers no evidence that such agreements are more prevalent in
industries characterized by concentrated labor markets. Indeed, one
source the Petition cites concludes that such agreements are more
frequent in product markets that are not concentrated.3 9 0 Other
things being equal, this datum suggests that entry into markets
where parties employ such restraints is relatively easy because
incumbent firms are profitably operating at relatively small shares of
the market, with the result that the minimum viable scale-an
important determinant of entry-is comparatively low. 391 This lack
of data, coupled with the dearth of adjudicated cases imposing
liability based upon such a theory, counsels against treating the risk
of raising rivals' costs schemes as a factor militating in favor of
abolishing employee noncompete agreements.
VIII. BANNING SUCH AGREEMENTS WILL PREDICTABLY RAISE THE
COSTS OF SOME SMALL RIVALS, ENRICHING LARGER FIRMS

The theory of raising rivals' costs is not irrelevant to the
As explained
assessment of employee noncompete agreements.
earlier, overly aggressive applications of antitrust laws during the
inhospitality era sometimes banned practices that allowed smaller

388.

See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 101, at 271-72 (discussing

conditions under which counterstrategies by targeted firms can undermine

raising rivals' costs scheme).
389. See id. at 267 ("Certainly, in most industries, exclusionary rights
contracts cannot be profitably employed for anticompetitive ends.").

390.

Petition, supra note 7, at 2-3; see Starr et al., supra note 183, at 61

in areas with greater
(finding that such agreements are "a bit more frequent ...
product market competition").
391. See, e.g., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 80, at 29
(explaining that the likelihood of entry depends in part on "the cost per unit the
entrant would likely incur, which may depend upon the scale at which the

entrant would operate").
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392
firms to achieve efficiencies already available to larger rivals.
These regulatory interventions "raised rivals' costs" every bit as much

as some private agreements did.393

United States v. Topco 39 4 was a quintessential example. Topco
was a joint venture of regional grocery chains formed to develop,
and distribute private-label products to venture
purchase,
members. 395 The United States conceded that the venture was lawful
but challenged ancillary agreements that assigned each member an
exclusive territory where only it could promote and sell Topco
products. 396 The District Court assessed the restraint under the factintensive Rule of Reason and concluded that the agreement produced
little, if any, anticompetitive harm. 39 7 The court also concluded that
the restraints fostered interbrand competition between Topco's
members and large, fully integrated chains that produced and
The government
promoted their own private-label products. 398
conceded that Section 1 of the Sherman Act did not reach the
integrated chains' private-label programs. 399 In particular, the court
found that the enforcement of such territories was necessary to induce
members to promote and advertise the various private-label products
distributed by the venture. 400
The Supreme Court reversed, condemning the restraints as
unlawful per se. 40 1 The district court's findings that such agreements
encouraged promotion and thus enhanced interbrand rivalry were
beside the point, the Court said. 402 Simply put, such impacts could
not justify the resulting contractual restrictions on the autonomy of
403
members to sell private-label products wherever they wished.

392.

See supranotes 6, 140-50 and accompanying text.

393. See generally Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Cost-Raising
Strategies, 36 J. INDUS. EcON. 19, 21-22 (1987) (observing that some firms can
injure competition by inducing captured agency to adopt regulations that impose
disproportionate costs on rivals); Steven C. Salop et al., A Bidding Analysis of

Special Interest Regulation: Raising Rivals' Costs in a Rent Seeking Society 1-2
(FTC Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 114, 1984).
394. 319 F.Supp. 1031, 1040 (N.D. Ill. 1970), rev'd, 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
395. Id. at 1032.
396. Id. at 1038-40.
397. Id. at 1041-43.
398. Id. at 1042-43.
were a
399. See id. at 1040 (noting government's concession that "if Topco ...
single, large national chain, none of its practices would be objectionable under
the antitrust laws"); see also Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S.

752, 776 (1984) (holding that conduct within a single firm is unilateral and thus
beyond the scope of Section 1).
400. Topco, 319 F. Supp. at 1042-43.
401. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610-612 (1972).
402. Id. at 610-11.
403. See id.
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The decision thus left the large, integrated chains entirely free to
continue promoting and selling their own private-label products while
hampering regional chains' efforts to replicate the same institutional
In his concurring opinion, Justice
framework by contract.404
Blackmun expressly recognized that, because of the Court's decision,
"[t]he bigs therefore should find it easier to get bigger," a result that
"seems at odds with the public interest."405 Two years later, the Court
approved a consent decree that relegated Topco's members to reliance
upon areas of primary responsibility. 406
In the same way, an outright ban on noncompete agreements
would sometimes raise the costs of small businesses that rely upon
such agreements to protect trade secrets and/or recoup their
investments in training employees. To be sure, any such ban would
apply to small and large firms alike. However, smaller firms will
often adopt production processes that utilize more labor per unit of
output and are thus "labor-intensive" as compared to the production
processes employed by larger rivals. 407 Relegating all firms to more
costly methods of enhancing a given employee's productivity will
sometimes impose a disproportionate impact upon those small firms
that utilize labor-intensive production processes. This result would
thereby advantage larger, capital-intensive firms and reduce
interbrand competition. 408 Indeed, one of the original scholarly
interventions that helped inspire the raising rivals' costs literature
examined the impact of an across-the-board wage increase on
competitive conditions in the coal industry. 409 The author, Professor
Williamson, concluded that such an increase disadvantaged small,
labor-intensive firms vis-A-vis the capital-intensive firms that
orchestrated the increase.410

404. Cf. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcON.
REV. 347, 347-50 (1967) (explaining that the institution of property can
internalize externalities that would otherwise exist).

405. Topco, 405 U.S. at 612-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
406. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 1973-1 Trade Cas. 1 74,485 at *2, 4
(N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd., 414 U.S. 801 (1973).
407. See Oliver E. Williamson, Wage Rates as a Barrier to Entry: The
Pennington Case in Perspective, 82 Q.J. ECON. 85, 97 (1968) (describing dichotomy
in the coal industry between smaller, labor-intensive firms and larger, capitalintensive firms).

408.

See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 101, at 238 (explaining that

exclusionary rights agreement that results in uniform price increase for inputs
will disadvantage rivals if the proponent of the agreement "uses the input less
intensively").

&

409. See Williamson, supra note 407, at 101-08; see also Krattenmaker
Salop, supra note 101, at 230 n.73 (including Professor Williamson's article
among those on cost-raising strategies that inspired recognition of raising rivals'
costs paradigm).
410. Williamson, supra note 407, at 108-09.
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This account of the impact of employee noncompete agreements
could help explain organized labor's support for banning such
agreements. 411 Cartelization of the labor supply by unions and
resulting supracompetitive wages naturally induces firms to adopt
production processes that are less labor-intensive than those adopted
by nonunion firms facing competitive labor markets. Imposing
regulations that reduce the productivity of labor will thus
disproportionately disadvantage nonunion, labor-intensive firms,
increasing the profits of unionized firms and wages of those who work
For similar reasons, of course, unions often support
there. 4 12
increases in minimum wages, even though their members generally
earn wages well above the legal minimum. 413 Policymakers truly
concerned with small firms and their employees will think twice
about banning agreements that help such firms improve their
employees' productivity.

411.

See supra note 65 and accompanying text (listing four unions that have

urged the FTC to abolish such agreements).
412.

See Alan J. Meese, CompetitionPolicy and the Great Depression:Lessons

Learned and a New Way Forward, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 255, 294-96
(2013) (describing how minimum wage laws, maximum hour laws, and bans on
"yellow dog" contracts disproportionately raised the costs of small, laborintensive, nonunion firms).

413.

See Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.

988, 1001 (1984) (contending that unions support minimum wages because they

"ha[ve] the effect of raising the price of substitute nonunion labor").

